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A LAW IN SEARCH OF A POLICY: A
HISTORY OF NEW YORK'S REAL
PROPERTY TAX EXEMPTION FOR
NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS
Robert L. Beebe*
Stephen J. Harrison**
I. Introduction
That the real property tax is at once both the most important
and the most controversial component of municipal finance has
been stated and restated in a series of studies produced during the
last decade.' Controversy engulfs seemingly the entire range of the
administration of this tax, from the establishment of assessments'
through to the rights of over-assessed property owners to obtain
* Counsel, New York State Board of Equalization and Assessment. B.A. 1966, Hamilton
College. J.D. 1969, Georgetown University Law Center.
** Associate Attorney, New York State Board of Equalization and Assessment. B.A. 1970,
State University of New York at Stony Brook. J.D. 1973, Albany Law School.
The authors wish to express their deep appreciation to Joan Valle, Sandra Dunn and
Dorothy Coffey, whose tireless and patient efforts were essential to the preparation of this
study.
1. E.g., NEW YORK SENATE STANDING COMM. 203d SEss. CERTIORARI - A REPORT ON AD-
MINISTRATIVE AND JUDICIAL REVIEW or REAL PROPERTY ASSESSMENTS (Apr. 1980); STATE OF
NEw YORK REPORT OF THE TEMP. STATE COMMISSION ON THE REAL PROPERTY TAX (1979);
NEW YORK ASSEMBLY WAYS & MEANS COMM., 201st SESs. ASSESSMENT ADMINISTRATION
(1978); NEW YORK STATE BOARD OF EQUALIZATION AND ASSESSMENT, INDEX OF PROPERTY TAX
NON-UNIFORMITY AMONG SCHOOL DISTRICTS IN NEW YORK STATE (1977); NEW YORK LEGISLA-
TIVE COMMISSION ON EXPENDITURE REVIEW, 200th SasS. THE OPTIONAL SERVICE CHARGE LAW
(Mar. 11, 1977); STATE OF NEW YORK, EDUCATIONAL FINANCE AND THE NEW YORK STATE REAL
PROPERTY TAX - THE INESCAPABLE RELATIONSHIP (1976); NEW YORK SENATE, TASK FORCE
ON CRITICAL PROBLEMS, 199th SEsS. THREE BILLION DOLLAR HURDLE (1976); STATE OF NEW
YORK, REPORT OF THE TEMP. STATE COMMISSION ON STATE AND LOCAL FINANCES, vol. 2, THE
REAL PROPERTY TAx (1975); STATE OF NEW YORK, TEMPORARY STATE COMMISSION ON CONSTI-
TUTIONAL TAX LIMITATIONS, FINAL REPORT (1975); STATE OF NEW YORK, REPORT OF THE
STATE COMMISSION ON EMINENT DOMAIN AND REAL PROPERTY ASSESSMENT REVIEW (1974);
STATE OF NEW YORK, REPORT OF THE NEW YORK STATE COMMISSION ON THE QUALITY, COST
AND FINANCING OF ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION (1972); STATE OF NEW YORK, FI-
NAL REPORT OF THE JOINT LEGISLATIVE COMM. TO STUDY AND INVESTIGATE REA PROPERTY
TAx EXEMPTIONS, LEGIS. Doc. No. 15 193d SEss. (1970); Biebe & Sinnott, In the Wake of
Hellerstein: Whither New York?, 43 ALB. L. Rov. 203, 411, 777 (1979).
2. See Hellerstein v. Assessor, Town of Islip, 37 N.Y.2d 1, 332 N.E.2d 279, 371 N.Y.S.2d
388 (1975), modified, 39 N.Y.2d 920, 352 N.E.2d 593, 386 N.Y.S.2d 406 (1976).
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refunds.3 The range of cases and controversies has spawned a new
lexicon, including terms such as "tax limit,"" "special equalization
ratios,"' "hold harmless,"' "Municipal Assistance Corporation '7
and "Emergency Financial Control Board." In the ebb and flow of
events, each problem seems to dominate the public attention for a
time only to recede without final resolution in the face of rising
concern over one of the others.
The problem of the erosion of the tax base due to a proliferation
of exemptions and exempt properties has remained a serious con-
cern, perhaps without having reached the crisis level of the others.
And yet many municipalities, particularly several of our largest cit-
ies and some of our most rural communities, face excruciating
problems as a result of dilution of their tax bases. Indeed, in direct
response to a perceived abuse and inappropriate expansion of the
nonprofit exemption, virtually an entire town ceased paying taxes
for two years by claiming exemptions as mail order ministers.9
As we enter the last two decades of the twentieth century, one of
the most difficult and sensitive subjects of real property tax ad-
ministration is the exemption available to property owned by non-
3. See Ed Guth Realty, Inc. v. Gingold, 34 N.Y.2d 440, 315 N.E.2d 441, 358 N.Y.S.2d 367
(1974); W.T. Grant Co. v. Srogi, 71 A.D.2d 457, 423 N.Y.S.2d 324 (4th Dep't 1979); 860
Executive Towers, Inc. v. Board of Assessors, 53 A.D.2d 463, 385 N.Y.S.2d 604 (2d Dep't
1976), aff'd sub nom. Pierre Pellaton Apts., Inc. v. Board of Assessors, 43 N.Y.2d 769, 372
N.E.2d 801, 401 N.Y.S.2d 1013 (1977); Slewett & Farber v. Board of Assessors, 97 Misc. 2d
637, 412 N.Y.S.2d 292 (Sup. Ct. 1978), afl'd, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 26, 1981, at 1, col. 2 (2d Dep't
Jan. 22, 1981).
4. Waldert v. City of Rochester, 44 N.Y.2d 831, 378 N.E.2d 115, 406 N.Y.S.2d 752, ap-
peal dismissed, 439 U.S. 922 (1978); Hurd v. City of Buffalo, 34 N.Y.2d 628, 311 N.E.2d 504,
355 N.Y.S.2d 369 (1974).
5. See Bloom v. Mayor of New York, 28 N.Y.2d 952, 271 N.E.2d 919, 323 N.Y.S.2d 436.
(1971) (Bergan, J., dissenting) (N.Y. CONST. art. VIII, § 10 prescribes a tax limit for New
York City of 21/2 % of the average full valuation to be determined by applying to the as-
sessed valuation over a stated period the ratio the assessed value bears to the full valuation).
See also Pellnat v. City of Buffalo, 100 Misc. 2d 848, 420 N.Y.S.2d 459 (Sup. Ct. 1979); N.Y.
REAL PROP. TAX LAW §§ 1250-1264 (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1980).
6. See Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 94 Misc. 2d 466, 408 N.Y.S.2d 606, 613-14 (Sup. Ct.
1978) ("save-harmless" provisions in 1974 N.Y. Laws chs. 241, 718 guarantee that a school
district will receive as much state aid in current year as it did in preceding year).
7. See Flushing Nat'l Bank v. Municipal Assistance Corp., 40 N.Y.2d 731, 358 N.E.2d
848, 390 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1976).
8. Wein v. State, 39 N.Y.2d, 136, 347 N.E.2d 586, 383 N.Y.S.2d 225 (1976) (The Board
was created during New York City's fiscal crisis. See 1975 N.Y. Laws ch. 868 § 5).
9. See State Bd. of Equal. and Assessment v. Kerwick, 91 Misc. 2d 152, 397 N.Y.S.2d
533 (Sup. Ct. 1977), af'd, 72 A.D.2d 292, 425 N.Y.S.2d 640 (3d Dep't 1980).
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profit organizations. Grounded in statutory law of the nineteenth
century, current section 420(1) of the Real Property Tax Law pro-
vides, in part, as follows:
(a) Real property owned by a corporation or association organized or
conducted exclusively for religious, charitable, hospital, educational, moral
or mental improvement of men, women or children or cemetery purposes, or
for two or more such purposes, and used exclusively for carrying out there-
upon one or more of such purposes either by the owning corporation or as-
sociation or by another such corporation or association as hereinafter pro-
vided shall be exempt from taxation as provided in this section.
(b) Real property owned by a corporation or association which is not
organized or conducted exclusively for religious, charitable, hospital, educa-
tional, moral or mental improvement of men, women or children or ceme-
tery purposes, or for two or more such purposes, but which is organized or
conducted exclusively for bible, tract, benevolent, missionary, infirmary,
public playground, scientific, literary, bar association, medical society, li-
brary, patriotic or historical purposes, for the enforcement of laws relating
to children or animals, or for two or more such purposes, and used exclu-
sively for carrying out thereupon one or more such purposes either by the
owning corporation or association, or by another such corporation or associ-
ation as hereinafter provided, shall be exempt from taxation; provided, how-
ever, that such property shall be taxable by any municipal corporation
within which it is located if the governing board of such municipal corpora-
tion, after public hearing, adopts a local law, ordinance or resolution so
providing. 10
Several scholarly works have been written on this subject includ-
ing one concerned primarily with educational properties,11 one con-
cerned with a general summary of the current statutory require-
ments12 and a third concerned with the overall philosophy of the
statute based upon a national survey.1" The study which follows
includes four continuing themes. First, in the nearly one hundred
years since the predecessor of our law was enacted, there has de-
10. N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 420(1) (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1980). Although New
York's real property tax exemption for nonprofit organizations was seemingly renumbered
as § 421 by 1971 N.Y. Laws ch. 417, § 5, the effective date of chapter 417, commonly re-
ferred to as the "service charge law," has been annually postponed by the legislature. See,
e.g., 1980 N.Y. Laws ch. 42. This section will be referred to herein as § 420.
11. Curtiss, Tax Exemption of Educational Property in New York, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 551
(1967).
12. Note, New York's Real Property Tax Exemptions for Religious, Educational, and
Charitable Institutions: A Critical Examination, 44 ALB. L. REv. 488 (1980).
13. Ginsberg, The Real Property Tax Exemption of Nonprofit Organizations: A Per-
spective, 53 TEMP. L.Q. 291 (1980).
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veloped an increasingly intense competition between the needs of
expanding municipal government and the expanding nonprofit or-
ganizations. Second, this competition is evident in the continuing
probing by exempt organizations at the outer limits of the scope of
the nonprofit exemption. Third, and similarly, municipalities have
maintained an aggressive attitude in seeking to restrict exempt
holdings by means of strict construction of the statute. And,
fourth, within these circumstances, the state legislature has re-
mained virtually silent since 1896, and the courts have been re-
quired to bear the responsibility for resolving these increasingly in-
tense conflicts.
The resulting situation is one in which administration, until re-
cently, has been almost entirely based upon a knowledge (or igno-
rance) of decisional law. The authors here hope to add to both the
scholarship and the public discussion of this most sensitive issue
by tracing the development of the law in New York State to the
point at which the current difficulties can be specifically isolated,
described, understood and, perhaps, begun to be resolved.
II. The Early Laws, Revised Statutes and Special
Laws: The Privilege of Exemption (1828-1896)
The history of the exemption from taxation of real property
owned by nonprofit organizations is divisible into three eras, the
first of which extends from the beginning of the state's history
through to 1896. This first era is notable because the law governing
the nonprofit exemption was established primarily by statute, with
decisional law serving primarily to enforce the statutory limits.
The courts invariably rejected requests for extensions of those lim-
its as being more appropriately a province of the legislature. More-
over, it is important to recognize that the courts were guided by
numerous and often very clear expressions of state policy as estab-
lished in legislation. As will be seen, there are several instances in
which the legislature amended the law following decisions in which
the judiciary had reluctantly concluded that existing statutes did
not provide a satisfactory remedy to a petitioning property owner.
Although the decisional law of this era is based upon statutory
provisions which are no longer in effect, the authors believe that a
review of the major decisions is both appropriate and necessary.
Certainly the review is appropriate because the law of this era is
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the first stage in the development of the current law, and it is im-
portant to know not only where we are but how we got here. How-
ever, this review of the early decisions is also necessary because
during this era, which marks the modern development of our law,
it has not been uncommon for the courts, in their role as the pri-
mary policy maker, to return to the old cases, regardless of their
limited relevance.
The earliest general exemption from taxation in New York
State, included in a 1799 law entitled "An act for the assessment
and collection of taxes," provided that
no house or land belonging to the United States, or the People of this State,
nor any church or place of public worship, or any personal property belong-
ing to any ordained minister of the gospel, nor any college or incorporated
academy, nor any school house, court house, gaol, alms house or property
belonging to any incorporated library, shall be taxed by virtue of this act."
The earlier law was superseded by section III of chapter 262 of
the Laws of 1823 which exempted, as is relevant to present section
420, "real estate belonging to . . . any college or incorporated
academy, . . . any building for public worship, school house, . ..
alms-house, house of industry, and all the real and personal prop-
erty belonging thereto, . . . [and] the property belonging to any
public library ....
Shortly thereafter, however, the first edition of the Revised Stat-
utes was prepared. It has been stated that "[t]he tax system in the
Revised Statutes was a revision of previous legislation perfected by
additional provisions recommended by the revisers or adopted by
the legislature. Prior to the enactment of the Revised Statutes, the
general system of taxation was prescribed by chapter 262 of the
Laws of 1823. "'5 Effective January 1, 1828, the law as set forth in
the Revised Statutes's exempted "[elvery building erected for the
use of a college, incorporated academy, or other seminary of learn-
ing; every building for public worship; every school house,. . . and
the several lots whereon such buildings are situated. . . .Subdivi-
14. 1799 N.Y. Laws ch. 72, § 32. Except for a $1500 limitation placed on the exemption
for ministers or priests (which is still found in N.Y. REAL PRop. TAx LAw § 460 (McKinney
Supp. 1980)), 1801 N.Y. Laws ch. 179, § 24 provided for the same exemption. See also 1813
N.Y. Laws ch. 52 § 28.
15. Catlin v. Trustees of Trinity College, 113 N.Y. 133, 139, 20 N.E. 864, 866 (1889).
16. [1828] N.Y. REv. STAT. pt. I, ch. XIII, tit. 1, § 4(3).
1981]
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sion 4 of section 4 exempted "every poor-house, alms-house, house
of industry, and every house belonging to a company incorporated
for the reformation of offenders, and the real and personal prop-
erty belonging to, or connected with the same," and subdivision 5
exempted "[tihe real and personal property of every public
library."
The statute remained substantially the same until 1893, prima-
rily because the more common method of tax exemption was
through enactment of special laws. As the court of appeals stated
in 1889:
It has never been the general policy of the state to wholly exempt the
property, either real or personal, of incorporated churches, colleges, or char-
itable institutions from taxation. There was a limited exemption of real es-
tate and personal property in the Revised Statutes. The policy of complete
exemption, where adopted, has been accomplished through special acts ap-
plicable to particular and specified corporations.
17
Between 1828 and 1896, it was estimated that over 100 supplemen-
tal acts were passed, many of which provided for special exemp-
tions. 8 And presumably because these acts were so numerous and
specific, there is virtually no appellate record of litigation relating
to special exemptions.
Undoubtedly, this factor also accounts for the relative paucity of
cases which arose with respect to the general exemption law during
this era. Even where the general law was applicable, there was lit-
tle that would admit of ambiguity, and where a question was
raised, the courts invariably adhered to a rule of strict construc-
tion. One interesting (and perhaps the earliest) example of this is
the case of Chegaray v. Mayor of New York, 1' wherein the court of
appeals construed the portion of the Revised Statutes quoted
above in denying an exemption to a privately owned boarding and
day school for girls. Looking to the statute, the court held that
"school-house" referred to public common schools, and that the
phrase "or other seminary of learning," preceded as it was by "col-
lege" and "incorporated academy," precluded all but property held
17. Catlin v. Trustees of Trinity College, 113 N.Y. at 141-42, 20 N.E. at 867.
18. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONERS OF STATUTORY REVISION OF THE STATE OF
NEW YORK 11 (1896).
19. 13 N.Y. 220 (1855).
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by corporations. 20 The court said, "It is evident that it was in-
tended to exempt only property used by the public for the pur-
poses of education, or which belonged to a corporation created for
the advancement of learning, and thereby devoted to educational
purposes. ' 21 This narrow construction, according to Judge Hand,
was necessary to avoid the possibility of persons building a school
room and establishing private schools in their homes, thereby ex-
empting their property from taxation. In acknowledging the re-
strictive effect of the decision, however, Judge Hand said, "I
should regret very much that our decision should discourage such
commendable efforts; but the meaning of the act appears to be
plain, and that must control."2
The rule of strict construction' prevailed throughout this first
era, and the reason for its prevalence was explained by the court of
appeals as follows:
Taxation is a burden. It is a common burden, for the common good. The
person or the class which is exempted therefrom is a favored one. A statute
giving favors at the expense of the public is not to be liberally interpreted.
Statutes conferring exemptions from taxation are to be strictly construed.2 3
As in the Chegaray case, the effect of this construction could be
very restrictive indeed when an owner had not obtained a special
exemption and found it necessary to rely on the general law. Thus,
the court of appeals held taxable certain real estate occupied and
used as a medical college, hospital and free dispensary for women
because it was not a building for public worship or a seminary and
no special act had exempted it.24
Given this state of the law, assessors seized upon even the slight-
est deviation from the existing criteria in determining taxable sta-
tus, and the burden of proof was clearly on the property owner.
Judicial review under these circumstances was often a very techni-
20. Id. at 228.
21. Id. at 229.
22. Id. at 230.
23. Buffalo City Cemetery v. City of Buffalo, 46 N.Y. 506, 508-09 (1871). See also People
ex rel. Westchester Fire Ins. Co. v. Davenport, 91 N.Y. 574, 586 (1883) ("The courts have
... required an exemption from taxation to be described in clear and unambiguous lan-
guage, and to appear to be, undisputably, within the intention of the legislature, or they
have declined to enforce it."); Roosevelt Hosp. v. Mayor of New York, 84 N.Y. 108 (1881).
24. People ex rel. New York Medical College and Hospital for Women v. Campbell, 93
N.Y. 196 (1883).
19811
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cal matter as can be seen in the opinion in Temple Grove Semi-
nary v. Cramer." The assessor of the City of Saratoga Springs had
revoked the exemption of an incorporated academy and seminary
of learning because the school had leased its buildings during the
school's summer vacation for use as a boarding house or hotel.
Here, however, the court was persuaded that the policy of exemp-
tion was for the encouragement of learning, and that permitting
the seminary to devote its premises to a profitable use during the
summer when the buildings were not needed or able to be used for
school purposes promoted the intent of the law.
Temple Grove was decided more than fifty years after the gen-
eral revision of 1828, and it is interesting to ponder whether the
statute had become inadequate in the changed circumstances of a
new era. We know, for example that during the last twenty years of
the nineteenth century there was a heightened concern for the de-
livery of services afforded by government and the nonprofit insti-
tutions.2 6 Perhaps these new circumstances are related to the ap-
parent relaxation of the rule of strict construction in two late
nineteenth century cases involving the care and education of chil-
dren. In People ex rel. Seminary of Our Lady of Angels v. Bar-
ber, ' 7 the assessors assessed as taxable certain land owned by a
school but used as a farm. However, the products of the farm were
used to supply the teachers, students, and staff of the school. The
lower court referred to the policy of the state to encourage institu-
tions of the type discussed therein because of the benefit they pro-
vided to society. The statute was to be given "a reasonably neces-
sary interpretation," which required "that the lot be devoted to no
use other than that which is necessary or fairly incidental to the
use and purposes of the institution."28 The lower court found the
entire property to be entitled to exemption, and the court of ap-
peals affirmed without opinion."9
In the second case, the high court did issue an opinion, in which
an apparent relaxation in the traditional rules of construction was
25. 98 N.Y. 121 (1885).
26. REPORT OF THE TEMPORARY STATE COMM'N ON STATE AND LOCAL FINANCES, vol. II THE
REAL PROPERTY TAX 104-05 (1975) [hereinafter cited as REAL PROPERTY TAX].
27. 49 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 27 (5th Dep't 1886), aff'd, 106 N.Y. 669, 13 N.E. 936 (1887).
28. Id. at 31.
29. 106 N.Y. 669, 12 N.E. 936 (1887).
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again present. In Association for the Benefit of Colored Orphans
v. Mayor,30 the court found that an orphan asylum, while not
shown to be exempt as a school house or building for public wor-
ship within subdivision three of section four of the aforecited Re-
vised Statutes, was an "alms-house" within the meaning of subdi-
vision four of that section and therefore exempt.31 The court noted
that, whereas prior to the adoption of the Revised Statutes, only
public alms-houses were exempt,s' the legislature was presumed to
have intended to broaden this exemption in the Revised Statutes.
The court said, "The general principle that statutes of exemption
should be strictly construed, we believe in and adhere to, but such
a case as this we do not regard as coming within that principle."3
The rationale for this conclusion was that the plaintiff was per-
forming a work of charity that would otherwise fall upon the pub-
lic. As such, it was outside the "mischief" which the strict con-
struction rule was meant to prevent.
The addition of the phrase "moral and mental improvement of
men and women" to the general law in 1893 3 was undoubtedly the
legislature's response to the court of appeals' reluctant denial of an
exemption of property owned by the Young Men's Christian Asso-
ciation ("YMCA") in New York City in 1889. Under the law as it
then stood, the court found the YMCA to be neither a seminary of
learning nor a building used for public worship, and, therefore,
taxable. The opinion concludes with the following comment: "As-
sociations of this character are so useful and so deserving of en-
couragement and support that a different result would please us
better, but we are unable to reach it under the law as it stands."' 5
In the 1893 amendment, the legislature added not only the
phrase "moral and mental improvement 'of men and women"
30. 104 N.Y. 581, 12 N.E. 279 (1887).
31. Id. at 588, 12 N.E. at 282.
32. 1826 N.Y. Laws ch. 10.
33. 104 N.Y. at 587, 12 N.E. at 281.
34. 1893 N.Y. Laws ch. 498 provided an exemption to real property of "a corporation or
association organized exclusively for the moral and mental improvement of men and women
or for religious, charitable, missionary, hospital, educational, patriotic, historical or cemetery
purposes, or for two or more of such 'purposes and used exclusively for carrying out there-
upon one or more of such purposes. .. ."
35. YMCA v. Mayor of New York, 113 N.Y. 187, 190, 21 N.E. 86, 87 (1889).
1981] 541
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(taken from the YMCA charter);" it also added the word "exclu-
sively" to modify both the organization and the use requirements
of the law. This exclusivity test of organization purpose and prop-
erty use was seemingly derived from laws which had been previ-
ously applicable only in New York City.3 7
These major decisions of the 1880's in combination with the rap-
idly changing social and economic conditions most certainly were
part of what was apparently a widespread concern that the laws
relating to taxation were in need of attention. There had been no
general revision of the tax statutes since 1829, and in 1889 the leg-
islature appointed a Commission for the Revision of the Statutes
of the State. 8 Among other things, the Commission was charged to
prepare both a report to the legislature and a bill for the consolida-
tion and revision of the general statutes of the state "relating to
the collection and assessment of taxes and the exemption of prop-
erty from taxation throughout the State." In discussing the situa-
tion which resulted in the appointment of the Commission, the
court of appeals stated:
The subject of taxation has been a great embarrassment to legislative
bodies throughout the history of the world. Special interests clash with gen-
eral interests and seek relief, wholly or in part, from the public burden
which is essential to the protection of property and the preservation of or-
der. Claims for exemption multiply and when the legislature yields to the
pressure of special interests, the precedent breeds a multitude of special
statutes and brings confusion into the law. Such was the situation that con-
fronted the legislature of 1889. ... 39
36. 5 Op. COUNSEL S.B.E.A. No. 17 at 34 (1976).
37. 1825 N.Y. Laws ch. 83 provided that with regard to buildings for public worship and
schools, the exemptions provided by 1823 N.Y. Laws ch. 262 were limited in New York City
to property "exclusively used for such purposes." Similarly, 1852 N.Y. Laws ch. 282 pro-
vided that the exemptions from taxation of buildings for public worship, school houses and
seminaries of learning under the provisions of [1828] N.Y. Rev. Stat., pt. I, ch. XIII, tit. 1, §
4(3) "shall not apply to any such building or premises in the City of New York, unless the
same shall be exclusively used for such purposes, and exclusively the property of a religious
society .. " (emphasis added). See also 1882 N.Y. Laws ch. 410 § 827. The fact that prop-
erty was not exclusively owned by the applicant led to denial of exemptions in Hebrew Free
School Ass'n v. Mayor of New York, 99 N.Y. 488, 2 N.E. 399 (1885) and failure to show
exclusive religious use contributed to the denial of exemptions in YMCA v. Mayor of New
York, 113 N.Y. 187, 21 N.E. 86 (1889).
38. See 1889 N.Y. Laws ch. 289 § 1.
39. Pratt Inst. v. City of New York, 183 N.Y. 151, 155, 75 N.E. 1119, 1120 (1905).
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III. The Tax Law: A Complete and Harmonious
System (1896-1944)
The Commissioners of Statutory Revision saw their effort as one
"to eliminate inconsistencies and to reduce the subject to a harmo-
nious and systematic whole, '40 and after several unsuccessful at-
tempts, they reported what became the Tax Law of 1896.1 In
terms of the property tax exemption available to property owned
by nonprofit organizations, the new law in part exempted the
real property of a corporation or association organized exclusively for the
moral or mental improvement of men or women, or for religious, bible,
tract, charitable, benevolent, missionary, hospital, infirmary, educational,
scientific, literary, library, patriotic, historical or cemetery purposes, or for
the enforcement of laws relating to children or animals, or for two or more
of such purposes, and used exclusively for carrying out thereupon one or
more of such purposes. .... .
In addition to the elimination of the special exemption laws, this
new general exemption statute retained the traditional purposes,
including those added in 1893, and added several new categories,
seemingly in an attempt to replace the types of activities exempted
by the special exemption laws. In so doing, the new law expressed
the acceptable purposes and activities in significantly less specific
language than the prior law.
Looking back nearly a century from today, with little primary
source material extant, the entire intent of the 1896 law is not
clear. We do know that the court of appeals held its effect to be
the repeal of all special exemption acts by implication, except
where a transfer of property was induced by promise of exemp-
tion."8 This, of course, coincided with the expressed purpose of the
Revisers to establish statewide standards through general law. And
having presumably corrected the inequalities in exemption which
40. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMIssIONERS OF STATUTORY REVISION OF THE STATE OF
NEW YORK 10-11 (1896).
41. 1896 N.Y. Laws ch. 908.
42. N.Y. TAX LAW § 4(7) (1896) (repealed).
43. People ex rel. Roosevelt Hosp. v. Raymond, 194 N.Y. 189, 87 N.E. 90 (1909). See
also People ex rel. Cooper Union v. Gass, 190 N.Y. 323, 83 N.E. 64 (1907); Pratt Inst. v. City
of New York, 183 N.Y. 151, 75 N.E. 1119.(1905); In re Estate of Huntington, 168 N.Y. 399,
61 N.E. 643 (1901). See generally J. SAXE, CHARITABLE EXEMPTION FROM TAXATION IN NEW
YORK STATE ON REAL AND PERSONAL PROPERTY 17 (1933).
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had "crept into the law during the preceding century or more"
and to ensure that no further exemptions were enacted by means
of special law, an amendment to the state constitution was pro-
posed and subsequently ratified in 1901 to prohibit exemptions
other than by general law. The amendment became part of article
III, section eighteen of the constitution when approved by the peo-
ple at the election of 1901. 46
However, the repeal of the special exemption laws in combina-
tion with the revised and less specific language of the new general
law also seems to have created a statutory framework which was
naturally at odds with the traditional rule of strict construction.
Thus, rather than providing an exemption for "every building for
public worship; every school house .. .every poor-house," [etc.]
the new statute offered exemption to all real property (assuming
satisfaction of the ownership and nonprofit requirements)
"used exclusively for religious . . . educational . . . charitable"
purposes. Moreover, the previously limited number of purposes
and uses had been substantially expanded to include activities
such as the "moral and mental improvement of men or women,
• . .bible, tract. . . benevolent. . . infirmary. . scientific, liter-
ary, library, patriotic, historical. . .[and] the enforcement of laws
relating to children or animals."
Although the Revisers and the legislature must surely have un-
derstood and been guided by the prior law as strictly interpreted
by the courts, one must consider, in retrospect whether the repeal
of the special laws was intended to be offset by the enactment of a
broader, less restrictive statute. Litigation was not long in coming,
and the early cases, perhaps not surprisingly, seemed to adhere to
the traditional rule of strict construction.
One of the first cases to construe the new Tax Law provision was
People ex rel. Young Men's Association for Mutual Improvement
v. Sayles.4 Under subdivision five of section four of the Revised
44. 10 NEw YORK STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION COMMIrEE, PROBLEMS RELATING
TO TAXATION AND FINANCE 206 (1938).
45. The constitutional amendment provided: "The legislature shall not pass a private or
loM1 bill in any of the following cases: . . .Granting to any person, association, firm or
corporation, an exemption from taxation on real or personal property." (currently codified
at N.Y. CONST. art. 3, § 17).
46. 32 A.D. 197, 53 N.Y.S. 67 (3d Dep't), afl'd, 157 N.Y. 677, 51 N.E. 1093 (1898). See
also People ex rel. Catholic Union v. Sayles, 32 A.D. 203, 53 N.Y.S. 65 (3d Dep't), affd, 157
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Statutes of 1828 (as amended), the relator's property had previ-
ously enjoyed total exemption as "the real and personal property
of a public library.'4 7 However, since the building was used only
partially as a library, when the Tax Law became effective, the as-
sessors assessed it. The court found that a small part of the build-
ing was used exclusively to carry out thereupon library purposes,
but that most of the building was used for theatrical performances,
public meetings and exhibitions. The income derived from these
uses was applied toward the organization's benevolent enterprises.
The court held the Tax Law would not permit a liberal interpre-
tation to exempt the property based on the usage of the revenue
derived from non-exempt uses for exempt purposes. Only free pub-
lic hospitals could still retain exemption on leased portions of
property when they used the revenue derived therefrom for the
maintenance and support of the hospital.48 The court also noted
that the rule of interpreting exemptions strictly against those
claiming that status was applicable to religious and charitable cor-
porations. Indeed, the language of the opinion would indicate that
this court found the new law to be more strict than the old, based
on the "used exclusively" test, previously limited to New York City
but now, under the Tax Law, applicable statewide. This decision of
the Third Department was affirmed without opinion."
Strict construction of the exemption and its various elements
continued to be the test applied by the courts and can be seen in
several cases involving education. In People ex rel. Delta Kappa
Epsilon Society v. Lawler,50 the appellate division upheld denial of
exemption to a fraternity house claiming exemption for its prop-
erty as a literary organization. The court noted that the purposes
for which a corporation is organized and the uses to which it puts
its property must coincide, or incorporators would state exempt
purposes in order to secure exemption and then use their property
for nonexempt purposes. Although the court found that on occa-
sion the property was used for exempt purposes, the predominant
N.Y. 679, 51 N.E. 1092 (1898).
47. [18281 N.Y. REV. STAT. pt. I, ch. XIII, tit. 1, § 4(5).
48. 1897 N.Y. Laws ch. 371. This provision can be found today in N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX
LAW § 420(5) (McKinney 1972).
49. 157 N.Y. 677, 51 N.E. 1093 (1898).
50. 74 A.D. 553, 77 N.Y.S. 840 (4th Dep't 1902), aff'd, 179 N.Y. 535, 71 N.E. 1136 (1904).
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use failed to satisfy the exclusivity test required,
[flor although we ought not, perhaps, to give to the word "exclusively" an
interpretation so literal as to prevent an occasional use of the relator's prop-
erty for some purpose other than one or more of those specified, yet the
policy of the law is to construe statutes exempting property from taxation
somewhat rigidly, and not to permit such exemption to be established by
doubtful implication. 1
Owners claiming exemption on the basis of educational use fre-
quently sought judicial review as the scope of the new exemption
law was tested. In a case involving a religious school, the Second
Department adopted the report of its referee, who, while recogniz-
ing the doctrine of strict construction, also stated that "strict con-
struction does not mean such a literal interpretation as would de-
feat or nullify the intention of the Legislature."5 However, the
court refused to exempt the entire parcel, finding a woodlot used
only as a source of lumber for improvements to other portions of
the school to be subject to taxation.
No exemption was granted in People ex rel. Adelphi College v.
Wells to a college-owned athletic field which was leased out to va-
rious athletic associations unconnected with the school during
school vacation periods.58 The court distinguished Temple Grove
Seminary," saying that that case was decided under the old Re-
vised Statutes, and that "[the language of the present Tax Law,
however, is quite different, and evinces, it seems to me, an intent
to restrict the exemption to a greater extent than was permitted
under the Revised Statutes."55
In the same year, citing Adelphi regarding the importance of
athletics, the same Second Department exempted an academy's
sleeping rooms, drill rooms, armories, stable, library, the residence
of the principals, recreation halls and dining halls, applying the
statute to exempt "the entire articulated system" of the institu-
tion.50 Since the same five judges decided these two cases but one
51. Id. at 557, 77 N.Y.S. at 842.
52. People ex rel. Missionary Sisters v. Reilly, 85 A.D. 71, 83 N.Y.S. 39 (2d Dep't 1903),
aff'd, 178 N.Y. 609, 70 N.E. 1107 (1904).
53. 97 A.D. 312, 89 N.Y.S. 957 (2d Dep't 1904), aff'd, 180 N.Y. 534, 72 N.E. 1147 (1905).
54. 98 N.Y. 121 (1885).
55. People ex rel. Adelphi College v. Wells, 97 A.D. at 315, 89 N.Y.S. at 958.
56. People ex rel. Board of Trustees of Mt. Pleasant Academy v. Mezger, 98 A.D. 237, 90
N.Y.S. 488 (2d Dep't 1904), aff'd, 181 N.Y. 511, 73 N.E. 1130 (1905).
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month apart and with no dissent in either case, the differences be-
tween the results can best be traced to the users of the property in
each and not the use, since an athletic field, exclusively used by a
college would presumably have been held to be part of the "articu-
lated system" of the school.
Part of this spate of litigation involving school owned real prop-
erty was a case which actually preceded those referred to above
and which was probably rather obscure at the time it was decided.
The property, owned by a small school for Indians, was located in
a town in Cattaraugus County. The assessors had assessed it as
fully taxable on the basis of the school's use of a substantial num-
ber of the 467 acres as farm, pasture, woodlot, timber and brush.
The school claimed entitlement to a full exemption.
In its decision in Blackburn v. Barton, the appellate division
cited the Sayles case in reiterating both the rule of strict construc-
tion and that in order to "secure the benefit of the exemption, it is
necessary that [the relator] should bring itself clearly within the
provisions of the statute." 5 However, the court also reached back
to a case decided under the prior law to permit certain activities
which were not strictly educational:
In determining whether property is used for the purposes of an institution
of this kind so as to exempt it from taxation, it must be made to appear
that the use is necessary or fairly incidental to the maintenance of the insti-
tution for the carrying out of the purposes for which it was organized. It is
not necessary that every particle of the real estate should be devoted to the
location of the buildings and the laying out of the grounds of the
institution. . ..
Relying on the doctrines enunciated in each case, the court found a
portion of the property, that is, farm land used for the growing of
crops used for the students' needs, to be exempt. Unused portions
were left taxable and a proportional exemption granted."
As noted above, this litigation was initiated because the asses-
sors considered the use of the land to be other than "educational"
57. People ex rel. Blackburn v. Barton, 63 A.D. 581, 583, 71 N.Y.S. 933, 935 (4th Dep't
1901).
58. Id. at 583. (relying on People ex rel. Seminary of Our Lady of Angels v. Barber, 49
N.Y. Sup. Ct. 27 (5th Dep't 1886), afl'd, 106 N.Y. 669,' 13 N.E. 936 (1887)).
59. The court in Sayles also noted that a partial exemption was possible in that case,
and that the assessors had done so, in effect, but not in form, by reducing the property's
assessment.
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while the owners believed the property should be wholly exempt.
The final decision came down more in favor of the assessors, with
the appellate court overruling a referee and special term, both of
whom had held the property to be wholly exempt. The appellate
division's reliance on the incidental use precedent of Our Lady of
Angels Seminary was seemingly a means by which to avoid so
strict a construction of the statute as to make the property fully
taxable. Read in this context, the court's comment did not seem to
break much new ground.
The "incidental" use test for exemption was applied by the court
of appeals in that same year. In People ex rel. Society of the Free
Church of St. Mary the Virgin v. Feitner,0 the court agreed with
the court below" that the portions of a clergy house adjoining a
concededly exempt church and occupied by three church curates
and the building engineer were wholly exempt. It did not agree
that the rectory was "necessary and incident" to the work of the
church, but found it to be a residence, and accordingly limited to
the $2,000 exemption provided by subdivision nine of section four
of the Tax Law."
Strict construction continued to be referred to as the primary
doctrine in the interpretation of tax exemption statutes,a8 but ex-
emptions were being granted by the courts on the basis of the inci-
dental use doctrine and its corollary, that interpretations should
not be so strict as to defeat the intent of the statute." For exam-
ple, the Fourth Department said that although exemption statutes
are to be strictly construed against those claiming exemption,"
60. 168 N.Y. 494, 61 N.E. 762 (1901).
61. 63 A.D. 181, 71 N.Y.S. 257 (1st Dep't 1901).
62. The exemption for the residence of officiating clergymen was added by 1892 N.Y.
Laws ch. 565 and is now contained in N.Y. REAL PROP. TAx LAW § 462 (McKinney 1972).
The limitation on the exemption was removed by 1958 N.Y. Laws ch. 281 and subsequently
recodified at 1959 N.Y. Laws ch. 733.
63. See People ex rel. Mizpah Lodge v. Burke, 228 N.Y. 245, 126 N.E. 703 (1920).
64. See Silver Bay Ass'n for Christian C. & T. v. Braisted, 80 N.Y.S.2d 548, 553 (Sup.
Ct. 1920), affd, 196 A.D. 913, 186 N.Y.S. 956 (3d Dep't 1921). It appears that the opinion
was unreported for some 28 years until cited in In re N.Y. Conf. Ass'n of Seventh-Day
Adventists, 80 N.Y.S.2d 8, 19 (Sup. Ct. 1948), rev'd, 275 A.D. 742, 87 N.Y.S.2d 709 (4th
Dep't), on remand, 111 N.Y.S.2d 329 (Sup. Ct. 1949), rev'd, 279 A.D. 845, 109 N.Y.S.2d 774
(4th Dep't), affd, 304 N.Y. 706, 107 N.E.2d 654 (1952).
65. In re Syracuse University, 214 A.D. 375, 212 N.Y.S. 253 (4th Dep't 1925) (citing
People ex rel. Mizpah Lodge v. Burke, 228 N.Y. 245, 126 N.E. 703 (1920)).
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their interpretation should not be so narrow as to defeat the Legis-
lature's intent to "encourage, foster and protect corporate institu-
tions of a religious, literary or educational character."' Based on
this construction, the court exempted Syracuse University's dormi-
tories, dining halls, hospital, athletic fields, and farm, as well as the
chancellor's residence.6 The decision confirmed assessments only
on a portion of a building rented and occupied as a store and three
vacant lots where no improvements were in progress or shown to
be contemplated in good faith."
With the exception of the several decisions in which the "inci-
dental use" and preservation of legislative intent qualifications
were applied to educational and religious holdings, there were no
major changes immediately apparent in the availability of this ex-
emption as a result of the new Tax Law. However, during the lat-
ter half of the 1920's, a series of cases occurred which suggested
that the use of property by nonprofit organizations was becoming
more complex than that which had been understood and accepted
in 1896. The common issues in these cases were used by persons
unrelated to the owner-petitioner and the production of income
from such use. For example, in Board of Foreign Missions v. Board
of Assessors,"' property consisting of six separate but contiguous
parcels was used as a home and resting place for returned Method-
ist missionaries and their families, as well as for conferences and
meetings. A closely divided court of appeals noted that had the
property use been so confined, it would have been entirely exempt.
However, since the main building, containing 100 guest rooms, was
used by 317 outside visitors in 1920 (out of a total of 3,575 users of
the property) and other buildings were used by outside parties,
three of the parcels were held to be taxable. The court noted that
income was derived from these properties; no income was derived
from three other parcels, one of which was used by missionary
66. In re Syracuse University, 214 A.D. 375, 377, 212 N.Y.S. 253, 256 (4th Dep't 1925)
(citing People ex rel. Seminary of Our Lady of Angels v. Barber, 49 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 27 (5th
Dep't 1886), aff'd, 106 N.Y. 669, 13 N.E. 936 (1887) and People ex rel. Missionary Sisters v.
Reilly, 85 A.D. 71, 83 N.Y.S. 39 (2d Dep't 1903), aff'd, 178 N.Y. 609, 70 N.E. 1107 (1904).
67. Id. at 377, 212 N.Y.S. at 256 (citing People ex rel. Board of Trustees of Mt. Pleasant
Academy v. Mezger, 98 A.D. 237, 90 N.Y.S. 488 (2d Dep't 1904), af'd, 181 N.Y. 511, 73 N.E.
1130 (1905).
68. See N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 420(3) (McKinney 1972).
69. 244 N.Y. 42, 154 N.E. 816 (1926).
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families with children or employees of the organization. The court
disagreed with the appellate divisionP70 which had held that all of
the parcels were tainted by the commercialism of the main build-
ing, pointing out the statutory authorization to exempt a portion of
property where appropriate. The other two parcels, presently va-
cant, were held to satisfy the good faith contemplation rule dis-
cussed above. Three judges dissented, arguing that either all six
parcels were taxable or otherwise all exempt, division of the prop-
erty being only for the convenience of the assessors. As a whole,
the dissenters would have held the property to be entirely taxable.
One judge voted to reverse the appellate division's denial of ex-
emption entirely.
These issues were the focal point of a series of three cases in-
volving the Young Women's Christian Association ("YWCA"), de-
cided between 1926 and 1928. In the first, 1 the organization sought
to cancel, as a cloud on title, the taxes for 1921-1923. The building
which provided lodging for women under thirty years of age and
who earned less than thirty dollars per week also contained (on the
first floor) a cafeteria open to the public. The facts showed that
more than half of the meals served were to the public for cash, at a
profit. Here, the First Department said that,
It is familiar law that statutes exempting property from taxation are to be
strictly construed and that the intention of the Legislature to grant immu-
nity must be clear beyond a reasonable doubt; the rule being that the right
of taxation exists unless the exemption is expressed in clear and unambigu-
ous terms, and that no claim of exemption can be sustained unless within
the express letter or the necessary scope of the exemption clause.7 2
The court concluded that the public patronage of the restaurant
was not merely occasional, sporadic or an emergency use, but
rather a daily practice for the purpose of receiving revenue. De-
spite the fact that this revenue was used for the "laudable" and
"praiseworthy" aims of the YWCA, no exemption was allowed to
the cafeteria and related portions of the property. While the appli-
cant may have been entitled to a partial exemption that is, on the
lodging portion of its property, its remedy in that respect was lim-
70. 207 A.D. 151, 202 N.Y.S. 50 (2d Dep't 1923).
71. YWCA v. City of New York, 217 A.D. 406, 216 N.Y.S. 248 (1st Dep't 1926), af'd, 245
N.Y. 562, 157 N.E. 858 (1927).
72. Id. at 408, 216 N.Y.S. at 251.
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ited to certiorari. In the following year, a different branch of the
YWCA in New York City found its property being assessed as tax-
able due to the operation of two small shops on the premises. In
again refusing to find that to be an exempt use, the same court
held the property partially exempt, while subjecting the shops to
taxation. '"
And finally, in the following year, a third branch of the organiza-
tion (located in Brooklyn) went to court in opposition to assess-
ments placed on apartments which were located in its building and
rented to its members. Here, however, the court found the use to
be unrelated to a purposeful production of income and not availa-
ble to the general public. Citing the prior YWCA cases and the
earlier Sayles decision 7 4 as authority for what would not be per-
mitted, and referring to Mount Pleasant Academy and its princi-
ple of the "articulated system,"' 5 the trial court held the entire
building to be exempt.6 This decision was affirmed without opin-
ion by both the appellate division and court of appeals."
Although several amendments had been made to section 4(7) of
the Tax Law during this period, it is sufficient to note here that
only bar associations 78 and public playgrounds' 9 were added to the
list of exempt purposes. However, it is evident that tax exemptions
continued to be of concern to the legislature during this period and
were the subject of frequent studies' 0 which were considered by
the 1938 Constitutional Convention.
Two cases concerning religious residential use should be noted as
well. In the first,'1 the Second Department granted an exemption
73. YWCA v. City of New York, 220 A.D. 49, 220 N.Y.S. 365 (1st Dep't 1927), af'd, 247
N.Y. 591, 161 N.E. 194 (1928).
74. See People ex rel. Young Men's Ass'n for Mutual Improvement v. Sayles, 32 A.D.
197, 53 N.Y.S. 67 (3d Dep't), af'd, 157 N.Y. 677, 51 N.E. 1093 (1898). See also notes 46-48
supra and accompanying text.
75. See People ex rel. Board of Trustees of Mt. Pleasant Academy v. Mezger, 98 A.D.
237, 90 N.Y.S. 488 (2d Dep't 1904), aff'd, 181 N.Y. 511, 73 N.E. 1130 (1905).
76. YWCA v. City of New York, 137 Misc. 321, 243 N.Y.S. 294 (Sup. Ct. 1928), aft'd, 227
A.D. 742, 236 N.Y.S. 926 (2d Dep't 1929), af'd, 254 N.Y. 558, 173 N.E. 865 (1930).
77. Id.
78. 1927 N.Y. Laws, ch. 565.
79. 1929 N.Y. Laws, ch. 382.
80. N.Y. LEGIS. Doc. No. 62 (1935); N.Y. LoIs. Doc. No. 77 (1932); N.Y. LEGIS. Doc.
No. 86 (1927); N.Y. LEGIS. Doc. No. 72 (1922); N.Y. SEN. Doc. No. 19 (1917).
81. St. Barbara's Roman Catholic Church v. City of New York, 243 A.D. 371, 277 N.Y.S.
538 (2d Dep't 1935).
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pursuant to Tax Law, section 4(7)82 to the residence of the teach-
ing staff (that is, nuns) of a parochial school. Relying on the St.
Mary" case for authority, the court held that given the semiclois-
tered status of the order this was a religious use. In addition, in
reliance on Syracuse,' the court found there was as much, if not
more, reason for exempting that portion of the property used by
the teaching staff as a place of residence than there had been for
the chancellor's residence in the Syracuse case. The court also
noted that "strict construction" could not be used to thwart the
purposes of the exemption.
In the other case, the court exempted a religious retreat which it
found to be used exclusively for the relator's purposes. 8 The prop-
erty, located in the Bronx, consisted of twelve acres of land, much
of which was undeveloped. The court set forth a long and detailed
discussion of the facts before reaching its conclusion, and it is evi-
dent that it was concerned with the effect of the decision. The
court referred to the "[t]ax exemption or such method of compen-
sation for services rendered" as "a free-for-all contest on the part
of state legislators" with municipalities receiving less benefit from
the organization's operations than they would have received from
the taxation foregone on the property. "The fault, if any, lies with
the legislature, and not with the courts which are compelled to fol-
low the verbiage of subdivision 6." 6
By the time of the 1938 Constitutional Convention, decisional
law had established that the exemption for nonprofit organizations
was contingent on three tests. First, the nonprofit status of the ap-
plicant, where in issue, had to be clearly proven."7 Second, the ap-
plicant's purposes could be ascertained from its incorporation pa-
82. Actually, by the time St. Barbara's was decided, the exemption had been renum-
bered subdivision six by 1933 N.Y. Laws, ch. 470, § 3, but as St. Barbara's involved taxes
between 1921 and 1932, the court referred to it by its former subdivision enumeration.
83. People ex rel. Society of the Free Church of St. Mary the Virgin v. Feitner, 168 N.Y.
494, 61 N.E. 762 (1901).
84. In re Syracuse University, 214 A.D. 375, 212 N.Y.S. 253 (4th Dep't 1925).
85. People ex rel. Outer Court, Inc., of the Order of the Living Christ v. Miller, 161
Misc. 603, 292 N.Y.S. 674 (Sup. Ct. 1936), afld, 256 A.D. 814, 10 N.Y.S.2d 208 (1st Dep't),
afl'd, 280 N.Y. 825, 21 N.E.2d 881 (1939).
86. Id. at 610, 292 N.Y.S. at 682.
87. Lawrence-Smith School, Inc. v. City of New York, 166 Misc. 856, 2 N.Y.S.2d 752
(Sup. Ct.), afl'd, 255 A.D. 762, 7 N.Y.S.2d 486 (1st Dep't 1938), aff'd, 280 N.Y. 805, 21
N.E.2d 693 (1939).
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pers, or if needed, by-laws."' And third, and by far the most
difficult test, actual use of the property in conformance with statu-
tory purposes had to be proven.
The statutory history and effect of real property tax exemptions
as it existed at the time of the 1938 Constitutional Convention is
contained in chapter X of volume X of the New York State Consti-
tutional Conventional Committee Reports. By design, however,
"advocacy of any particular proposal was avoided" in that report.89
The Report of the Committee on Taxation of the Constitutional
Convention, which was reported to the Convention, in relevant
part, provided:
Exemptions from taxation may be granted only by general laws. Exemp-
tions may be altered or repealed except those exempting real or personal
property used exclusively for religious, educational or charitable purposes
and owned by any corporationor association organized or conducted exclu-
sively for one or more of such purposes and not operating for profit. The
Legislature may, however, prescribe limitations upon the extension of such
exemptions in the various counties in relation to the taxable property
therein."
The Committee's rationale for the proposed language was:
[T]hat the legislative power with respect to exemptions from taxation
should be circumscribed in order to avoid the resultant increased burden
upon taxable property. Therefore, it (i.e., the Committee) deemed it wise to
provide for the granting of exemptions by general laws which may be al-
tered or repealed except as to property used exclusively for religious, educa-
tional or charitable purposes and owned by organizations conducted exclu-
sively for one or more of such purposes and not operating for profit. Those
corporations are discharging social obligations which the State would other-
wise have to assume and are reasonably entitled to constitutional protection
in the exemptions granted to them with respect to that property essential to
the operation and maintenance of their work. With respect to the extension
of such exemptions in the various counties, the legislature may prescribe
limitations in relation to the taxable property therein.91
88. In re Estate of De Peyster 210 N.Y. 216, 104 N.E. 714 (1914); Board of Educ. v.
Baker, 241 A.D. 574, 272 N.Y.S. 801 (4th Dep't 1934), af'd, 266 N.Y. 636, 195 N.E. 359
(1935). The effect of a corporation's by-laws upon its tax-exempt status was examined in
Corp. of Yaddo v. Saratoga Springs, 216 A.D. 1, 214 N.Y.S. 523 (3d Dep't 1926).
89. 10 NEw YORK STATE CONsTrrTIONAL CONVENTION, PROBLEMS RELATING TO TAXATION
AND FINANCE v (1938).
90. 1938 Nzw YORK STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION Doc. II, REPORT OF THE COMMrr-
TEE ON TAXATION 1-2.
91. Id. at 2.
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The last sentence in the quoted section was explained by Com-
mittee Chairman Saxe during the Convention debates. He said:
Now, let me say with respect to that, that if these exemptions grow to
such an extent that they are going to result in an undue burden upon the
taxable property, the legislature is empowered to work out a limitation so
that the taxable property will not suffer by reason of the extension of these
exemptions in the future.9'
Debate on this sentence continued, with Chairman Saxe indicating
that his committee was concerned with the possibility of exemp-
tions in any particular county in the future becoming an undue
burden of other taxable property.9 Other delegates were concerned
that the provisions could result in particular organizations being
singled out for taxation." Finally, it was determined that an agree-
ment would be sought before the proposal was offered on third
reading.' 6 Subsequently, the sentence empowering the legislature
to prescribe limitations on exemptions was stricken, unfortunately
with no discussion on that decision in the record.6 The provision
concerning tax exemptions was included in section one of article
XVI of the Constitution of 1938, which was adopted by the people
on November 8, 1938, and has not since been amended.
IV. The Tax Law and the Real Property Tax Law: To
Give Full Effect to the Policy (1945-1980)
On January 1, 1939, the new state constitution took effect, and a
portion of the new article XVI, entitled "Taxation," provided as
follows:
Exemptions from taxation may be granted only by general laws. Exemp-
tions may be altered or repealed except those exempting real or personal
property used exclusively for religious, educational or charitable purposes as
defined by law and owned by any corporation or association organized or
conducted exclusively for one or more of such purposes and not operating
for profit.9
7
92. 1938 REVISED RECORD OF THE CONsTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF NEW
YORK voL. II, 110-11 [hereinafter cited as REVISED RECORD].
93. Id. at 1121.
94. Id. at 1123-24.
95. Id. at 1125.
96. Id. at vol. III, 2444.
97. N.Y. CONsT. art. XVI, § 1.
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Whether by coincidence or due to an accumulation of circum-
stances, there now occurs a brief hiatus in the judicial law inter-
preting the nonprofit exemption. At this point the statutory law
had remained relatively unchanged since its enactment in 1896,es
and the judicial decisions interpreting that statute were grounded
primarily in the traditional rule of strict construction.
There had been some early need to review the scope of the ex-
emption in light of the new language of 1896, particularly with re-
gard to schools, and as has been described, decisions such as
Mount Pleasant's and Syracuse University e had shown that the
new statute contemplated a broader scope than that of 1828. How-
ever, with the exception of a line of decisions which began to de-
velop in the 1930's,101 the courts had established a definite and
consistent three-step test in reviewing applications for exemption
by nonprofit organizations. And for each of these tests, the courts
had consistently applied a standard of strict construction: the ex-
clusive organization requirement was governed by the act, charter
or by-laws of the organization; e10 non-exempt uses of the property
would either result in denial of the exemption 03 or in taxation of a
separately assessed portion of the property;'" and the organization
98. 1896 N.Y. Laws ch. 908.
99. People ex rel. Board of Trustees of Mt. Pleasant Academy v. Mezger, 98 A.D. 237, 90
N.Y.S. 488 (2d Dep't 1904), aff'd, 181 N.Y. 511, 73 N.E. 1130 (1905).
100. In re Syracuse University, 214 A.D. 375, 212 N.Y.S. 253 (4th Dep't 1925).
101. YWCA v. City of New York, 137 Misc. 321, 243 N.Y.S. 294 (Sup.Ct., 1928), aff'd,
227 A.D. 742, 236 N.Y.S. 926 (2nd Dept. 1929), aff'd, 254 N.Y. 558, 173 N.E. 865 (1930);
People ex rel. Corp. of Yaddo v. Freeman, 259 N.Y. 620, 182 N.E. 207 (1932); St. Barbara's
Roman Catholic Ch urch v. City of New York, 243 A.D. 371, 277 N.Y.S. 538 (2d Dep't 1935);
People ex rel. Christodora House v. Miller, 254 A.D. 670, 4 N.Y.S.2d 993 (1st Dep't 1938),
aff'd, 278 N.Y. 652, 16 N.E.2d 303 (1938); People ex rel. Trustees of Masonic Hall and
Asylum Fund v. Miller, 279 N.Y. 137, 18 N.E.2d 8 (1938); People ex rel. Buffalo Turn Ver-
ein v. Assessors, City of Buffalo, 256 A.D. 772, 12 N.Y.S.2d 170 (4th Dep't 1939).
102. In re De Peyster's Estate, 210 N.Y. 216, 104 N.E. 714 (1914); Board of Educ. v.
Baker, 241 A.D. 574, 272 N.Y.S. 801 (4th Dep't 1934), aff'd, 266 N.Y. 636, 195 N.E. 359
(1935); People ex rel. Corp. of Yaddo v. Freeman, 259 N.Y. 620, 182 N.E. 207 (1932).
103. People ex rel. Mizpah Lodge v. Burke, 228 N.Y. 245, 126 N.E. 703 (1920); People ex
rel. N.Y. Lodge No. 1 v. Purdy, 179 A.D. 805, 167 N.Y.S. 285 (1st Dep't 1917), af'd, 224
N.Y. 710, 121 N.E. 885 (1918); People ex rel. Delta Kappa Epsilon Soc'y v. Lawler, 74 A.D.
553, 77 N.Y.S. 840 (4th Dep't 1902), af'd, 179 N.Y. 535, 71 N.E. 1136 (1904); People ex rel.
Young Men's Ass'n v. Sayles, 32 A.D. 197, 53 N.Y.S. 67 (3d Dep't), af'd, 157 N.Y. 677, 51
N.E. 1093 (1898).
104. In re Board of Foreign Missions v. Board of Assessors, 244 N.Y. 42, 154 N.E. 816
(1926); People ex rel. Society of the Free Church of St. Mary the Virgin v. Feitner, 168 N.Y.
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was not permitted to operate at a profit.10 5
The brief hiatus in decisional law is basically the years 1940
through 1944. The forces and factors which had begun with the
Great Depression""e included the adoption of the new state consti-
tution,0 7 the Second World War, the nation's exposure to modern
totalitarianism, 08 and the immediate aftereffects of the end of the
war, including overwhelming needs and demands for housing, med-
ical care and education. As one examines the judicial interpreta-
tions of the nonprofit exemption statute beginning in 1945, it
seems apparent that one of the essential factors which must be
considered is that the courts were faced with the duty of applying
a fifty-year old statute to rapidly changing social conditions and
circumstances. It is striking, particularly in the first several years
subsequent to 1944, to observe the broadening of the scope of the
exemption in reliance upon decisional law which in many cases ei-
ther had held property to be subject to taxation in whole or in
part, or had found circumstances so special as to necessitate ex-
emptions which might be described as sui generis.10' Indeed, in
one of the decisions often cited subsequent to 1944, the court had
494, 61 N.E. 762 (1901); YWCA v. City of New York, 220 A.D. 49, 220 N.Y.S. 365 (1st Dep't
1927), aff'd, 247 N.Y. 591, 161 N.E. 194 (1928); YWCA v. City of New York, 217 A.D. 406,
216 N.Y.S. 248 (1st Dep't 1926), afld, 245 N.Y. 562, 157 N.E. 858 (1927); People ex rel.
Adelphi College v. Wells, 97 A.D. 312, 89 N.Y.S. 957 (2d Dep't 1904), aff'd, 180 N.Y. 534, 72
N.E. 1147 (1905).
105. Lawrence-Smith School, Inc. v. City of New York, 166 Misc. 856, 2 N.Y.S.2d 752
(Sup. Ct.), afl'd, 255 A.D. 762, 7 N.Y.S.2d 486 (1st Dep't 1938), a/ffd, 280 N.Y. 805, 21
N.E.2d 693 (1939). See also note 87 supra and accompanying text.
106. Buffalo Turn Verein v. Reuling, 155 Misc. 797, 798, 281 N.Y.S. 545, 546 (Sup. Ct.
1935).
107. Pursuant to 1936 N.Y. Laws, ch. 598, the question of whether to hold a constitu-
tional convention was submitted to the voters on November 3, 1936. The question was an-
swered in the affirmative. Purusant to 1938 N.Y. Laws, ch. 376, the convention met in Al-
bany, beginning on April 5, 1938. The proposed constitution was divided into nine
amendments and submitted to the voters on November 8, 1938. Six amendments were ap-
proved, and three amendments were disapproved.
108. This issue was discussed frequently during the 1938 Constitutional Convention
heretofore discussed. See REvISED RECORD, supra note 92, at vol. I, 272, 477 and vol. II,
1140.
109. See, e.g., People ex rel. Trustees of the Masonic Hall and Asylum Fund v. Miller,
279 N.Y. 137, 18 N.E.2d 8 (1938); People ex rel. Christodora House v. Miller, 254 A.D. 670,
4 N.Y.S.2d 993 (1st Dep't) afl'd, 278 N.Y. 652, 16 N.E.2d 303 (1938); Webster Apts. v. City
of New York, 118 Misc. 91, 193 N.Y.S. 650 (Sup. Ct. 1922), afl'd, 206 A.D. 749, 200 N.Y.S.
956 (1st Dep't 1923).
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lamented the state of the law and stated that "relief from this situ-
ation can only be obtained from the Legislature."110
A second essential factor which must be considered throughout
this review is that at the same time as the nonprofit organizations
were expanding their holdings and activities in order to respond to
the needs which they perceived in the post-war era, the municipal
governments of the state were doing the same. The necessary re-
sult of this parallel expansion of services in the context of
municipal finance was that the exempt organizations were seeking
to secure and increase their exempt holdings while the municipal
governments were seeking to preserve and expand their tax bases.
This is a competition and conflict which has continued through to
the present day.""'
Lower court decisions in the late 1940's adhering to the basic
rules of strict construction were not uncommon. Precedents existed
which affirmed the action of assessors in returning previously ex-
empt property to the rolls11 and which denied the petitions of ex-
panding nonprofit organizations seeking exemption for new types
of property holdings.1 Typical of this type of decision is that in
which a lower court stated that although it had not been referred
to any authorities which were controlling, "there are certain princi-
ples of law applicable on all issues of exemption from taxation
110. People ex rel. Outer Court, Inc., of the Order of the Living Christ v. Miller, 161
Misc. 603, 610, 291 N.Y.S. 678, 682 (1938).
Tax exemption or such method of compensation for services rendered has, however,
tended to become a free-for-all contest on the part of State legislators, with the result
that municipalities are now forced to forego taxes on lands and buildings to the ex-
tent of millions of dollars, without an adequate corresponding return to the commu-
nity in a great many instances. Today section 4 of the Tax Law (especially subdivi-
sion 6) in many respects imposes a hardship not only on the State but also on the
average taxpayer. The fault, if any, lies with the Legislature, and not with the courts,
which are compelled to follow the verbiage of subdivision 6. Relief from this situation
can only be obtained from the Legislature.
Id. at 610, 292 N.Y.S. at 681-82.
111. St. Joseph's Health Center Properties, v. Srogi, 51 N.Y.2d 127, 412 N.E.2d 921, 432
N.Y.S.2d 865 (1980) (Cooke, C.J., dissenting).
112. New York Catholic Protectory v. City of New York, 175 Misc. 472, 22 N.Y.S.2d 739,
(Sup.Ct. 1940).
113. See People ex rel. Watchtower Soc'y v. Haring, 8 N.Y.2d 350, 170 N.E.2d 677, 207
N.Y.S.2d 673 (1960); In re New York Conference As'n of Seventh-Day Adventists, 80
N.Y.S.2d 8 (Sup. Ct. 1948), rev'd, 275 A.D. 742, 87 N.Y.S.2d 708 (4th Dep't 1949); People ex
rel. Cornell Univ. v. Thorne, 184 Misc. 630, 57 N.Y.S.2d 6 (Sup. Ct. 1945).
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* . ." and that the principle with application in this case is that
"tax exemptions, however, are limitations of sovereignty and are
strictly construed .... If ambiguity or uncertainty occurs, all
doubt must be resolved against the exemption."1 " "
There also continued to be isolated examples of the successful
petitioning for exemption by nonprofit organizations in what
amounted to sui generis situations, 5 such as the granting of an
exemption to a church which had originally been denied exemption
by the City of New York on the grounds that it had been incorpo-
rated outside of the State of New York." ' Perhaps the major deci-
sion of this nature is that of People ex rel. Doctors Hospital v.
Sexton,1 7 in which the City of New York unsuccessfully sought to
tax a hospital which had petitioned for exemption, despite the fact
that it had originally been organized as a profitmaking enterprise.
Faced with this potential loss of tax base and without the benefit
of any precise definition of the term "hospital," the city contended
that eligibility for this exemption required an element of charity in
the operation of the hospital.
In commenting on the city's contention, the appellate division
stated that
[tihe public policy of the State requiring tax exemption to be determined by
law (Tax Law, §3) would then be meaningless. No such power was given to
respondents by the Legislature and indeed article XVI, section 1 (adopted
in 1938) of the Constitution of the State of New York, is an express man-
date against any rule of discretion or rule of reason that has been here
suggested."'
This decision was affirmed by the court of appeals without opinion,
and in the years since it has often been cited as authority in deci-
sions which deny, modify or reverse strict administrative interpre-
tation of the nonprofit exemption by local assessors.
The nature and extent of the requirement that charity be part of
114. People ex rel. Cornell Univ. v. Thorne, 184 Misc. at 632, 57 N.Y.S.2d at S (quoting
People v. Brooklyn Garden Apts., Inc., 283 N.Y. 373, 380, 28 N.E.2d 877, 879 (1940)).
115. In re Ladycliff College, 266 A.D. 753, 41 N.Y.S.2d 149 (2d Dep't 1943), afl'd, 293
N.Y. 712, 56 N.E.2d 729 (1944).
116. Williams Inst. Colored Methodist Episcopal Church v. City of New York, 275 A.D.
311, 89 N.Y.S.2d 300 (1st Dep't 1949), affd, 300 N.Y. 716, 92 N.E.2d 58 (1950).
117. 267 A.D. 736, 48 N.Y.S.2d 201 (1st Dep't 1944), aff'd, 295 N.Y. 553, 64 N.E.2d 273
(1945).
118. Id. at 743, 48 N.Y.S.2d at 207.
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the exempt organization's purposes and activities was again ad-
dressed by the courts in the following year in the case People ex
rel. Untermyer v. McGregor."' Involving the apparently very un-
usual situation of the application of the cy pres doctrine by the
surrogate court to maintain and preserve a piece of property as a
public playground or park, this decision has become the principal
basis for petitions seeking exemption of land which is said to bene-
fit the general public because of its unimproved and natural state.
A review of the opinioh of the court of appeals, however, shows
that in the absence of both statutory definition and decisional law
relating to this type of property, the court created law by finding
the land to be
an embellishment or adjunct to the successful maintenance and develop-
ment of the whole project as a place of healthy and cultural enjoyment....
[w]hen we take into consideration the exclusive public use to which the ex-
ecutors and trustees, during their interim ownership, and the trustees of the
corporation have devoted the property, it seems clear and indisputable that
it is exempt from taxation .... 2
The influx of new students and the establishment of new house-
holds resulting from the return of the members of the armed forces
were undoubtedly social changes of immense proportions during
this era. The difficulties which these circumstances created and
their effect upon the competition between the exempt organiza-
tions and the municipal governments, is perhaps first described in
the decision entitled People ex rel. Thomas G. Clarkson Memorial
College of Technology v. Haggett.12 1 The lower court opinion pro-
vides the following summary of the facts:
Essentially we here have for determination the question whether dwellings
or apartments owned and maintained by a college but assigned to its teach-
ers or administrators as private dwellings at a stated periodic rental, but
without requirement that the same be open for public or semi-public edu-
cational or administrative activities, constitutes such a part of the articu-
lated educational system of the college as to permit their exemption from
taxation....
119. 295 N.Y. 237, 66 N.E.2d 292 (1946).
120. Id. at 244, 66 N.E.2d at 295. But see People ex rel. Blackburn v. Barton, 63 A.D.
581, 584, 71 N.Y.S. 933, 936 (4th Dep't 1901), wherein it was stated "The remainder is not
used at all ... and it clearly does not come within the exemption .... "
121. 191 Misc. 621, 77 N.Y.S.2d 182 (Sup. Ct. 1948), affd, 274 A.D. 732, 87 N.Y.S.2d 491
(3d Dep't), afl'd, 300 N.Y. 595, 89 N.E.2d 882 (1949).
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It does not appear that we in this State have passed upon this precise
issue, divorced from other considerations. 22
The court noted that "[a]s has been the common experience of ed-
ucational institutions, its faculty, staff and student body have mul-
tiplied several times since the end of the war. To meet the demand
for additional accommodations it has purchased and used several
former residential properties in Potsdam and has also opened a
branch at Malone in Franklin County. 1 23
Having reviewed the decisional law of New York and several
other states and having suggested that the experience of Clarkson
College would surely be repeated by other colleges throughout the
state, the court commented that "the rule should be fixed with cer-
tainty both for the guidance of the taxing authorities and of the
institutions involved."" 4H However, with the necessity to decide the
case within the circumstances which had been presented to it, the
court found that
A college with students but no faculty is much more of an anomaly than
one with a faculty but no students. In our conception of the term, a faculty
and a student body, for all practical considerations, are necessarily coexist-
ent if there is to be a college.
So viewing the matter, I hold that, as real properties used for the corpo-
rate purposes of the relator, within the proper exercise of discretion of its
trustees and within the purview of the statute, the . . . properties are ex-
empt from taxation. .... ,25
Upon appeal, the appellate division was evidently concerned
with the expansive nature of the holding of the lower court.
We do not agree that our statutory prescription whereby the real estate of
an educational corporation is made exempt from taxation is the recognition
of any fundamental right. . . . While that history gives some basis for re-
laxing the general rule of strict construction, still, in essence, all such ex-
emptions are in arrest of the sovereign power of the State.",
Nevertheless, the appellate division affirmed the lower court find-
ing, and, in turn, the decision was affirmed by the court of appeals
122. Id. at 624-25, 77 N.Y.S.2d at 186.
123. Id. at 622, 77 N.Y.S.2d at 184.
124. Id. at 626, 77 N.Y.S.2d at 187.
125. Id. at 627-28, 77 N.Y.S.2d at 188-89.
126. 274 A.D. at 735, 87 N.Y.S.2d at 493.
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without opinion. The resulting extension of the benefit of the stat-
ute to properties which were devoted to private residential pur-
poses, even to the extent of family units, can be seen as the
equivalent of the Untermyer decision in terms of its subsequent
effect on the scope of the exemption.
Several years after its affirmance without opinion of the Clark-
son case, the court of appeals confirmed its holding in a non-prop-
erty tax exemption case by stating that in the Clarkson case "this
court has held. . . that college-owned buildings rented by the col-
lege to faculty members are exempt from realty taxation as being
'used exclusively for carrying out' one of the purposes of the own-
ing corporation. 12 7 And again in 1957, the court had occasion to
state that
It is however generally known, which in these times may be judicially no-
ticed, that hospitals customarily provide living accommodations for at least
some of their personnel. Here, there was, in fact, testimony that some of the
nurses and technicians would not have taken employment in this hospital or
would not have continued their employment if living quarters had not been
so provided .... Whether the persons using the dwellings in the manner
shown constitute a family unit need not detain us, since it clearly appears
that the dwellings are being used as an accessory to the hospital. '"
Although municipal governments attempted to restrict the effect
of the Clarkson holding by suggesting that the result depended
upon the existence of an extraordinary housing shortage brought
on by the influx of war veterans to a school, they were not success-
ful, and the precedent became established.' 2 The issue of the taxa-
ble status of housing accommodations owned by an otherwise ex-
empt nonprofit organization was essentially laid to rest in 1962
with the decision of the court of appeals in St. Luke's Hospital v.
Boyland.130 At the outset the court distinguished between the
terms "hospital" and "free public hospital" in the statute"' and
concluded that because St. Luke's was not a free public hospital it
127. New York Univ. v. Temporary State Rent Comm'n, 304 N.Y. 124, 127-28, 106
N.E.2d 44, 46 (1952) (citation omitted).
128. De Mott v. Notey, 3 N.Y.2d 116, 119, 143 N.E.2d 804, 806, 164 N.Y.S.2d 398, 400
(1957) (emphasis in original).
129. See Pratt Inst. v. Boyland, 16 Misc. 2d 58, 174 N.Y.S.2d 112 (Sup. Ct. 1958), aff'd, 8
A.D.2d 625, 185 N.Y.S.2d 753 (2d Dep't 1959).
130. 12 N.Y.2d 135, 187 N.E.2d 769, 237 N.Y.S.2d 308 (1962).
131. Id. at 143, 187 N.E.2d at 772, 237 N.Y.S.2d at 312.
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was not entitled to a total exemption of the property. However,
citing the housing shortage cases, 13 2 and building upon the devel-
oping principle that "a use which 'is reasonably incident' to the
major purpose" of the exempt organization was acceptable,'" the
court held that "it is clear" that apartments occupied by hospital
personnel and their families are exempt.13 4
Since St. Luke's, otherwise exempt organizations are clearly per-
mitted to operate and furnish housing to their personnel and mem-
bers, virtually without restriction in the terms of location and
use."3 ' This expansion of the scope of the nonprofit exemption,
plainly engrafted on the statute by judicial interpretation, has
never been directly addressed by the state legislature. And al-
though acquiescence may be construed as acceptance on the part
of the legislature, the effect of the legislative silence on this subject
has more recently been manifested in a further probing of the lim-
its of the exemption as it relates to housing and the exclusively
organized requirement of the statute. This problem will be taken
up in a later portion of this study.3 6
Although perhaps somewhat less clear than the results of Clark-
son in relation to housing properties, the precedent of Untermyer
can be seen to have had a significant effect upon the difficult ques-
tion of the taxable status of unimproved properties. In a lower
court case decided within the decade following Untermyer, the
court held that land acquired "to protect the far flung view from
132. De Mott v. Notey, 3 N.Y.2d 116, 143 N.E.2d 804, 164 N.Y.S.2d 398 (1957); New
York Univ. v. Temporary State Rent Comm'n, 304 N.Y. 124, 106 N.E.2d 44 (1952); People
ex rel. Thomas G. Clarkson Memorial College of Technology 191 Misc. 621, 77 N.Y.S.2d 182
(Sup. Ct.. 1948), aff'd, 274 A.D. 732, 87 N.Y.S.2d 491 (3d Dep't), a/I'd, 300 N.Y. 595, 89
N.E.2d 882 (1949).
133. St. Luke's Hosp. v. Boyland, 12 N.Y.2d at 143, 187 N.E.2d at 772, 237 N.Y.S.2d at
312, (quoting People ex rel. Watchtower Soc'y v. Haring, 8 N.Y.2d 350, 358, 170 N.E.2d 677,
681, 207 N.Y.S.2d 673, 678 (1960)).
134. Id.
135. See University of Rochester v. Wagner, 63 A.D.2d 341, 408 N.Y.S.2d 157 (4th Dep't
1978), a/I'd, 47 N.Y.2d 833, 392 N.E.2d 569, 418 N.Y.S.2d 583 (1979); In re Faculty-Student
Ass'n v. Sharkey, 35 A.D.2d 161, 316 N.Y.S.2d 698 (4th Dep't 1970), a/I'd, 29 N.Y.2d 621,
273 N.E.2d 139, 324 N.Y.S.2d 411 (1971); In re Syracuse Univ., 59 Misc. 2d 684, 300
N.Y.S.2d 129 (Sup. Ct. 1969).
136. See St. Joseph's Health Center Properties, Inc. v. Srogi, 51 N.Y.2d 127, 412 N.E.2d
921, 432 N.Y.S.2d 865 (1980); In re Marino P. Jeantet Residence For Seniors, Inc. v. Com-
missioner of Fin., 105 Misc. 2d 1080, 430 N.Y.S.2d 545 (Sup. Ct. 1980); Belle Harbor Home
of the Sages v. Tishelman, 100 Misc. 2d 911, 420 N.Y.S.2d 343 (Sup. Ct. 1979).
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the Hall of Fame" of New York University was entitled to the ex-
emption from taxation.187 Relying in part on Untermyer, the court
stated simply that "the trustees of the university had the obliga-
tion of protecting the view."18 In ensuing years Untermyer has
been cited as authority for exempting unimproved land which is
used in association with activities found by the courts to be reli-
gious,1 3 educational 4" and for the moral and mental improvement
of men, women and children.' There has been increasing recogni-
tion that the undefined extent to which unimproved land is ex-
empt creates insoluble problems for both tax administrators and
the courts. 4' However, legislative silence has continued, and the
courts have been required to continue to pass upon exemption pe-
titions which are seeking increasingly expansive interpretations of
the statute in relation to vacant land. The most recent manifesta-
tions of this process are the holdings in separate cases in which
both an appellate division and a trial court granted petitions for
exemption for unimproved land used as a buffer to protect other-
wise exempt property.1 48
Having identified Doctors Hospital, Untermyer and Clarkson
College as seminal cases in the modern interpretation of the non-
profit exemption statute, it is appropriate to add to that group a
fourth case, Pace College v. Boyland.1 " Here again, the court was
137. In re Major Deegan Blvd., 131 N.Y.S.2d 330, 331 (Sup. Ct. 1954).
138. Id. at 332.
139. See Greater N.Y. Corp. of Seventh-Day Adventists v. Town of Dover, 29 A.D.2d
861, 288 N.Y.S.2d 334 (2d Dep't), appeal dismissed, 23 N.Y.2d 682, 243 N.E.2d 150, 295
N.Y.S.2d 932 (1968). See also Gospels Volunteers, Inc. v. Village of Speculator, 33 A.D.2d
407, 308 N.Y.S.2d 785 (3d Dep't 1970), afld, 29 N.Y.2d 622, 273 N.E.2d 139, 324 N.Y.S.2d
412 (1971).
140. Chautauqua Inst. v. Town of Chautauqua, 35 A.D.2d 1, 312 N.Y.S.2d 364 (4th
Dep't), appeal denied, 27 N.Y.2d 485, 315 N.Y.S.2d 1025 (1970). See Mohonk Trust v.
Board of Assessors, 47 N.Y.2d 476, 392 N.E.2d 876, 418 N.Y.S.2d 763 (1979).
141. Nassau County Council Boy Scouts of America v. Assessors, Town of Rockland, No.
1271-79 (Sup. Ct. Mar. 10, 1980).
142. THE REAL PROPERTY TAX, supra note 26, at 120-28. See also Nassau County Council
Boy Scouts of America v. Assessors, Town of Rockland, slip op. at 6-9 (Sup. Ct. 1980) "The
problem continues to intensify and there does not appear to be an answer on the horizon.
The sole corrective step taken by the Legislature was their recognition of the existence of
the problem." Id. at 14.
143. See Nassau County Council, Boy Scouts of America v. Assessors, Town of Rock-
land, slip op. at 11-12; Order Minor Conventuals v. Lee, 64 A.D.2d 227, 409 N.Y.S.2d 667
(3d Dep't 1978).
144. 4 N.Y.2d 528, 151 N.E.2d 900, 176 N.Y.S.2d 356 (1958).
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confronted with the situation of a rapidly expanding nonprofit or-
ganization (in this case the college had converted an entire 16-
story office building to use for its purposes) and its confrontation
with the municipal taxing authorities. The college had converted a
portion of the office building into a cafeteria, which in turn was
leased to private business concerns for operation for school pur-
poses. Under the terms of an interim agreement with the college,
the lessee-operator was permitted to make a profit, although there
apparently was authority to renegotiate the agreement if the col-
lege came to consider the lessee to be making an undue profit. The
New York City Tax Commission revoked part of the previous total
exemption of the building, and the college petitioned the court for
a reinstatement of that total exemption.
In holding that "(tihis cafeteria is part of the operation of Pace
College," '14 ' the court of appeals seemingly disregarded well estab-
lished law relating to partial taxation" and created a new prece-
dent which subsequently has been melded into the incidental use
doctrine. In a vigorous dissent to this holding, two of the judges
stated that the result was directly contrary to the Sayles case 147
and at variance with the plain language of the statute."18 In sug-
gesting that "[o]nly the legislature may do this,""9 the dissent
cites the 1948 amendment of the Tax Law as an example of legisla-
tive response to judicial decisions which had maintained the pre-
vailing interpretation of the statute despite changed circumstances
which seemingly militated in favor of a different result."50
Two years later, in People ex rel. Watchtower Bible and Tract
Society, Inc. v. Haring,1 the court of appeals was faced with the
145. Id. at 532, 151 N.E.2d at 902, 176 N.Y.S.2d at 358.
146. See, e.g., Board of Foreign Missions v. Board of Assessors, 244 N.Y. 42, 154 N.E.
816 (1926); People ex rel. Society of the Church of St. Mary the Virgin v. Feitner, 168 N.Y.
494, 61 N.E. 762 (1901); YWCA v. City of New York, 220 A.D. 49, 220 N.Y.S. 365 (1st Dep't
1927), aff'd, 247 N.Y. 591, 161 N.E. 194 (1928); YWCA v. City of New York, 217 A.D. 406,
216 N.Y.S. 248 (1st Dep't 1926); People ex rel., Adelphi College v. Wells, 97 A.D. 312, 89
N.Y.S. 957 (2d Dep't 1904), affid, 180 N.Y. 534, 72 N.E. 1147 (1905); People ex rel. Black-
burn v. Barton, 63 A.D. 581, 71 N.Y.S. 933 (4th Dep't 1901).
147. People ex rel. Young Men's Ass'n v. Sayles, 32 A.D. 197, 53 N.Y.S. 67 (3d Dep't),
aff'd, 157 N.Y. 677, 51 N.E. 1093 (1898).
148. Pace College v. Boyland, 4 N.Y.2d at 535, 151 N.E.2d at 903, 176 N.Y.S.2d at 361.
149. Id. at 536, 151 N.E.2d at 904, 176 N.Y.S.2d at 361.
150. Id. at 535, 151 N.E.2d at 903, 176 N.Y.S.2d at 361.
151. 8 N.Y.2d 350, 170 N.E.2d 677, 207 N.Y.S.2d 673 (1960). Here, the court construed
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complex situation of a religious sect (that is, Jehovah's Witnesses)
owning and operating a large farm, which they contended to be
wholly and exclusively for the religious purposes of the organiza-
tion. Over the course of a five-year period, the lower courts had
consistently rejected the organization's petitions for exemption on
the grounds that the large-scale operation of a farm was simply not
an exclusive use of property for an exempt purpose,'" and that the
farm was neither operated for educational or religious purposes nor
as "a necessary adjunct for the religious functions of the petitioner
or for carrying out the purposes of its incorporation." 1 In refer-
ring to the nonprofit exemption as "a public policy statute,"'" the
court concluded that "historically and in reason, the only test is
whether the farm operation is reasonably incident to the major
purpose of its owner. There can be no doubt about that here."'
Although the result reached in Watchtower was undoubtedly
due in part to the association with religion, a factor which will be
discussed in more detail below, 5 the holding also can be seen as
yet another judicial expansion of the law based upon the incidental
use doctrine. And just as with the seminal cases of Doctors Hospi-
tal, Untermyer, Clarkson and Pace, this case and its principle of
incidental use have been repeatedly cited in subsequent years
as authority for exemption in numerous uses of property includ-
ing housing,1 57 recreation," religious camps, 169 conference cen-
the exemption now contained in N.Y. RsAL PROP. TAX LAW § 420 (McKinney 1972 & Supp.
1980), following the recodification of that law, 1958 N.Y. Laws ch. 959. No substantive
change was intended, N.Y. RL PRoP. TAx LAW § 2002(6) (McKinney Supp. 1980).
152. People ex rel. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y, Inc. v. Mastin, 191 Misc. 899, 80
N.Y.S.2d 323 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
153. People ex rel. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y, Inc. v. Haring, 8 N.Y.2d at 355, 170
N.E.2d at 678, 207 N.Y.S.2d at 675.
154. Id. at 357, 170 N.E.2d at 680, 207 N.Y.S.2d at 677.
155. Id. at 358, 170 N.E.2d at 680-81, 207 N.Y.S.2d at 678.
156. See notes 166-79 infra and accompanying text.
157. University of Rochester v. Wagner, 63 A.D.2d 341, 408 N.Y.S.2d 157 (4th Dep't
1978), afl'd, 47 N.Y.2d 833, 392 N.E.2d 569, 418 N.Y.S.2d 583 (1979). See St. Luke's Hosp.
v. Boyland, 12 N.Y.2d 135, 187 N.E.2d 769, 237 N.Y.S.2d 308 (1962).
158. Chautauqua Inst. v. Town of Chautauqua, 35 A.D.2d 1, 312 N.Y.S.2d 364 (4th Dep't
1970); Faculty-Student Ass'n of Harpur College, Inc. v. Dawson, 57 Misc. 2d 112, 292
N.Y.S.2d 216 (Sup. Ct. 1967).
159. Gospel Volunteers, Inc. v. Village of Speculator, 33 A.D.2d 407, 308 N.Y.S.2d 785
(3d Dep't 1970), affd, 29 N.Y.2d 622, 273 N.E. 2d 139, 324 N.Y.S.2d 412 (1971).
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ters," education,'' buffer zones 60 and boy scout camps.16s
By 1960, the results of fifteen years of litigation interpreting the
nonprofit exemption statute in light of the radically different social
and economic circumstances of the post-war era had produced a
core group of six decisions (Doctors Hospital, Untermyer, Clark-
son College, Pace College, Watchtower and St. Luke's) which had
virtually superseded the decisional law of the pre-war era. And al-
though there continued to be decisional law reiterating the doc-
trine of strict construction, these interpretations invariably con-
cerned situations which were virtually sui generis.'4 The
juxtaposition to the pre-war era is striking.' e5
The sensitivity of governmental action involving religion in this
country can of course be traced back to the first amendment to the
United States Constitution. Undoubtedly, the experience of the
holocaust and the modern totalitarianism adopted as a form of
government by major nations of the world during the twentieth
century served only to heighten the sensitivity of this issue. One
needs only to review the decisions of the New York State Court of
Appeals and the United States Supreme Court in Walz v. Tax
Commission'" to appreciate the difficulty associated with this is-
sue as it arises in the context of municipal taxation.
One of the earliest post-war exemption cases in which the courts
160. Trustees of Columbia Univ. v. Taylor, 76 Misc. 2d 717, 351 N.Y.S.2d 928 (Sup. Ct.
1974).
161. Rudolph Steiner Educ, and Farming Ass'n, Inc. v. Brennan, 65 A.D.2d 868, 410
N.Y.S.2d 404 (3d Dep't 1978); Rabbi Solomon Kluger School, Inc. v. Town of Liberty, 76
Misc. 2d 691, 351 N.Y.S.2d 563 (Sup. Ct. 1974).
162. Order Minor Conventuals v. Lee, 64 A.D.2d 227, 409 N.Y.S.2d 667 (3d Dep't 1978).
163. Nassau County Council Boy Scouts of America v. Assessors, Town of Rockland, No.
1271-79 (Sup. Ct. Mar. 10, 1980).
164. YMCA v. Rochester Pure Waters Dist., 37 N.Y.2d 371, 334 N.E.2d 586, 372
N.Y.S.2d 633 (1975); City of Lackawanna v. State Bd. of Equal. and Assessment, 16 N.Y.2d
222, 212 N.E.2d 42, 264 N.Y.S.2d 528 (1965); BOCES v. Buckley, 15 N.Y.2d 971, 207 N.E.2d
528, 259 N.Y.S.2d 858 (1965); Semple v. School for Girls v. Boyland, 308 N.Y. 382, 126
N.E.2d 294 (1955); Plattsburgh College Benevolent and Educ. Ass'n, Inc. v. Board of Asses-
sors, 43 Misc. 2d 741, 252 N.Y.S.2d 229 (Sup. Ct. 1964); People ex rel. Provident Loan Soc'y
v. Chambers, 196 Misc. 367, 88 N.Y.S.2d 459 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
165. People ex rel. Trustees of Masonic Hall and Asylum Fund v. Miller, 279 N.Y. 147,
18 N.E.2d 8 (1938); People ex rel. Corp. of Yaddo v. Freeman, 259 N.Y. 620, 182 N.E 207
(1932); People ex rel. Christodora House v. Miller, 254 A.D. 670, 4 N.Y.S.2d 993 (1st Dep't),
aff'd, 278 N.Y. 652, 16 N.E.2d 303 (1938); Webster Apts. v. City of New York, 118 Misc. 91,
193 N.Y.S. 650 (Sup. Ct. 1922).
166. 24 N.Y.2d 30, 246 N.E.2d 517, 298 N.Y.S.2d 711 (1969), aff'd, 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
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were asked to define "religious" in terms of a request for an expan-
sion of that definition concerned a four acre island and forty-six
acres of adjacent mainland used for eight weeks each summer as a
boys' camp. Finding that the owning corporation was incorporated
to give instruction in Christian doctrine and maintain camps for
physical, moral and spiritual advancement, both the trial court and
the appellate division held the property to be exempt as a "reli-
gious summer camp".167 The sole authority cited for this holding
was an unreported 1920 special term decision (affirmed by the ap-
pellate division without opinion) holding a similar facility for
adults to be exempt. That decision, published twenty-eight years
later, contained no reference to either specific statutory or judicial
authority for its holding.1 8 Rather than indicating a lack of schol-
arship on the part of the courts, this unsupported but expansive
interpretation of the term religious may very well have been the
result of the courts' judgment or hope that the situations at issue
were so isolated and so sensitive that simply granting the petition
would best serve society's purposes.
The provisions contained within both the federal and state con-
stitutions, in combination with heightened post-war sensitivity to
religious freedom, received surprisingly little direct comment by
the courts.16 In fact, the strongest statement is probably contained
in a court of appeals opinion in a zoning case in which the court
stated that, "[t]he paramount authority of this State [that is, the
State Constitution] has declared a policy that churches and schools
are more important than local taxes, and that it is in furtherance
of the general welfare to exclude such institutions from
taxation. '17 0
167. Christian Camps, Inc. v. Village of Speculator, 275 A.D. 868, 88 N.Y.S.2d 377 (3d
Dep't 1949).
168. Silver Bay Ass'n For Christian Conferences & Training v. Braisted, 80 N.Y.S.2d 548
(Sup. Ct. 1920), aff'd, 196 A.D. 913, 186 N.Y.S. 956 (3d Dep't 1921).
169. People ex rel. Thomas G. Clarkson Memorial College of Tech. v. Haggett, 274 A.D.
732, 87 N.Y.S.2d 491 (3d Dep't 1949); Trustees of Columbia Univ. v. Taylor, 76 Misc. 2d
717, 351 N.Y.S.2d 928 (Sup. Ct. 1974); Rabbi Solomon Kluger School, Inc. v. Town of Lib-
erty, 76 Misc. 2d 691, 351 N.Y.S.2d 563 (Sup. Ct. 1974); American Press, Inc. v. Lewisohn,
74 Misc. 2d 562, 345 N.Y.S.2d 396 (Sup. Ct. 1973), afl'd, 48 A.D.2d 798, 372 N.Y.S.2d 194
(1st Dep't 1975); In re Religious Soc'y of Families, 73 Misc. 2d 923, 343 N.Y.S.2d 159 (Sup.
Ct. 1973), aff'd, 75 A.D.2d 1004, 429 N.Y.S.2d 321 (4th Dep't 1980).
170. Diocese of Rochester v. Planning Bd., 1 N.Y.2d 508, 524-25, 136 N.E.2d 827, 836,
154 N.Y.S.2d 849, 861 (1956).
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The sensitivity of the court of appeals in the 1960 Watchtower
case was evident in its statement that well-established decisional
law supported a finding that both the owning organization and its
use of the property were religious and would "serve as an answer to
the argument made or suggested here that the somewhat rudimen-
tary training of these Witnesses and the unorthodox character of
their religious beliefs and practices removed them from the benefi-
cent aim and coverage of this statute. 1 7 1 Similarly, in finding that
a former country club converted to a "spiritual retreat" by Seventh
Day Adventists was a religious use of real property, the appellate
division relied on two pre-war cases172 and the Christian Camps
decision. 78 The court of appeals denied appeal by.the town with-
out opinion.1 7 '
Building on the decisions in Christian Camps, Watchtower,
Walz and Seventh Day Adventists, a series of decisions during the
1970's granted petitions for exemptions for properties owned by
churches or affiliated religious organizations and used for summer
camps,'1 75 public restaurants 76 and vacant land used for religious
retreats.17
7
As with other purposes and terms from the statute, the continu-
ing necesssity for judicial interpretations has continued to extend
the limits of the existing definition of the term religious. In the few
instances in which courts have refused to expand the scope of the
definition, the results are seemingly dictated by facts which indi-
171. People ex rel. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y, Inc. v. Haring, 8 N.Y.2d 350, 359,
170 N.E.2d 677, 681, 207 N.Y.S.2d 673, 678-79 (1960).
172. People ex rel. Blackburn v. Barton, 63 A.D. 581, 71 N.Y.S. 933 (4th Dep't 1901);
People ex rel. Outer Court, Inc., of the Order of the Living Christ v. Miller, 161 Misc. 603,
292 N.Y.S.2d 674 (Sup. Ct. 1936), afrd, 256 A.D. 814, 10 N.Y.S.2d 208 (1st Dep't), affrd, 280
N.Y. 825, 21 N.E.2d 881 (1939).
173. Greater N.Y. Corp. of Seventh-Day Adventists v. Town of Dover, 29 A.D.2d 861,
288 N.Y.S.2d 334 (2d Dep't), appeal dismissed, 23 N.Y.2d 682, 243 N.E.2d 150, 295
N.Y.S.2d 932 (1968).
174. 23 N.Y.2d 682, 243 N.E.2d 150, 295 N.Y.S.2d 932 (1968).
175. Chautauqua Inst. v. Town of Chautauqua, 35 A.D.2d 1, 312 N.Y.S.2d 364 (4th Dep't
1970); Gospel Volunteers, Inc. v. Village of Speculator, 33 A.D.2d 407, 308 N.Y.S.2d 785 (3d
Dep't 1970), aff'd, 29 N.Y.2d 622, 273 N.E.2d 139, 324 N.Y.S.2d 412 (1971); Rabbi Solomon
Kluger School, Inc. v. Town of Liberty, 76 Misc. 2d 691, 351 N.Y.S.2d 563 (Sup. Ct. 1974).
176. Shrine of Our Lady of Martyrs v. Board of Assessors, 40 A.D.2d 75, 337 N.Y.S.2d
786 (3d Dep't 1972), af'd, 33 N.Y.2d 713, 304 N.E.2d 563, 349 N.Y.S.2d 993 (1973).
177. Mary Immaculate School v. Wilson, 73 A.D.2d 969, 424 N.Y.S.2d 251 (2d Dep't
1980).
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cate a total inconsistency with any semblance of understood terms
of religion17 8 or because of circumstances so unusual that the re-
viewing court is unable to marshall all the facts necessary for a
decision and sends the case back for further fact-finding. 179
Given the entire range of modern decisional law relative to what
is now section 420 of the Real Property Tax Law, the term "educa-
tional" has undoubtedly generated at once the most expansive and
the most confusing series of interpretations from the courts. With
one exception, the decisions of the modern era adhering to a strict
construction of the term "education" have been limited to either
isolated situations involving the nonprofit and organization re-
quirements 80 or lower court decisions involving relatively minor
property holdings. 8 ' The exception in the case of Swedenborg
Foundation, Inc. v. Lewisohn,59 wherein the court of appeals
seemed to establish a precise and strict series of criteria by which
administrators and future courts would be able to establish
whether an organization's purposes and uses were indeed "educa-
tional." However, within four years, virtually the same court of ap-
peals concluded that "some 5,000 acres of undeveloped wilderness
land located in thet upper reaches of the Shawangunk Moun-
tains. ... ." which "is heavily wooded with hard wood and- ever-
greens and contains a variety of geological formations"'18 was
"used primarily for an assortment of 'charitable . . . educational,
[and] moral improvement of men, women or children's pur-
poses...."I8  The court further stated that it could "see no rea-
son why these categories should not encompass lands used for en-
178. See Crusade for Christ, Inc. v. Town of New Lebanon, 36 A.D.2d 247, 320 N.Y.S.2d
164 (3d Dep't 1971), aff'd, 31 N.Y.2d 765, 290 N.E.2d 440, 338 N.Y.S.2d 440 (1972); In re
Religious Soc'y of Families, 73 Misc. 2d 923, 343 N.Y.S.2d 159 (Sup. Ct. 1973), afl'd, -
A.D.2d -, 429 N.Y.S.2d 321 (4th Dep't 1980).
179. Holy Spirit Ass'n v. Tax Comm'n, 62 A.D.2d 188, 404 N.Y.S.2d 93 (1st Dep't 1978);
F.O.R. Holding Co. v. Board of Assessors, 45 A.D.2d 875, 357 N.Y.S.2d 875 (2d Dep't 1974).
180. BOCES v. Buckley, 15 N.Y.2d 971, 207 N.E.2d 528, 259 N.Y.S.2d 858 (1965); Sem-
pie School for Girls v. Boyland, 308 N.Y. 382, 126 N.E.2d 294 (1955).
181. Hudson Inst., Inc. v. Cernese, 39 A.D.2d 576, 332 N.Y.S.2d 59 (2d Dep't 1972);
Plattsburgh College Benevolent and Educ. Ass'n, Inc. v. Board of Assessors, 43 Misc. 2d 741,
252 N.Y.S.2d 229 (Sup. Ct. 1964); Faculty-Student Ass'n of N.Y. State College for Teachers
v. City of Albany, 17 Misc. 2d 404, 191 N.Y.S.2d 120 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
182. 40 N.Y.2d 87, 351 N.E.2d 702, 386 N.Y.S.2d 54 (1976).
183. Mohonk Trust v. Board of Assessors, 47 N.Y.2d 476, 480, 392 N.E.2d 871, 418
N.Y.S.2d 763, 764 (1979).
184. Id. at 484, 392 N.E.2d at 880, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 767.
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vironmental and conservation purposes which are necesssary to the
public good and which are open to and enjoyed by the public. (cit-
ing Untermyer)"18
This case, Mohonk Trust v. Board of Assessors,"" is perhaps the
best indication of the extent to which this provision of the law has
been expanded by modern judicial interpretation based on the de-
cisions of the early post-war years. Prior to 1945, it would have
been virtally impossible to construct an argument based on statute
or decisional law which would have offered persuasive authority to
exempt this type of land as being used for an educatinal purpose.
However, in the post-war years, among the exempt organizations,
those concerned with education have clearly been among the most
expansive and aggressive, and our society has most assuredly
evinced a deep and continuing concern for the creation and main-
tenance of the highest quality education available.1 87
In the face of these circumstances, and given only the 1896 law
with which to order society's priorities on this issue, the courts
have built upon the principles established by those early post-war
decisions. Thus one can see a progression from the housing
shortage situation in Clarkson College, in combination with St.
Luke's and Watchtower, to a series of decisions which consistently
hold that housing owned by educational organizations and sup-
plied to faculty and students is exempt from taxation. 88 Likewise
building upon the principles of Clarkson, Pace and Watchtower,
the courts have progressed through a series of decisions in which
they have found qualified for the educational exemption uses such
as a theater group,189 facilities for continuing education,190 an ice
185. Id. See also North Manursing Wildlife Sanctuary v. City of Rye, 48 N.Y.2d 135, 397
N.E.2d 693, 422 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1979) (citation omitted).
186. 47 N.Y.2d 476, 392 N.E.2d 876, 418 N.Y.S.2d 763 (1979).
187. See San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); Serrano
v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971), cert. denied sub nor.
Clownes v. Serano, 432 U.S. 907 (1977); Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 94 Misc. 2d 466, 408
N.Y.S.2d 606 (Sup. Ct. 1978).
188. University of Rochester v. Wagner, 63 A.D.2d 341, 408 N.Y.S.2d 157 (4th Dep't
1978), aff'd, 47 N.Y.2d 833, 392 N.E.2d 569, 418 N.Y.S.2d 583 (1979); Pratt Inst. v. Boyland,
16 Misc. 2d 58, 174 N.Y.S.2d 112 (Sup. Ct. 1958), afl'd, 8 A.D.2d 625, 185 N.Y.S.2d 753 (2d
Dep't 1959); People ex rel. Thomas G. Clarkson Memorial College of Tech. v. Haggett, 191
Misc. 621, 77 N.Y.S.2d 182 (Sup. Ct. 1948), affd, 274 A.D. 732, 87 N.Y.S.2d 491 (3d Dep't),
af'd, 300 N.Y. 595, 89 N.E.2d 882 (1949).
189. Little Theater of Waterbury, Inc. v. Hoyt, 7 Misc. 2d 907, 165 N.Y.S.2d 292 (Sup.
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skating rink, 91 . conference centers (even those operated by private
organizations)1 92  and various non-traditional settings such as
camps, 9" farms 4 and large tracts of unimproved land. 9 '
The expansion of the interpretation of educational use has been
paralleled in the courts' interpretations of the educational purpose
requirement in the line of faculty student association cases begin-
ning with Faculty-Student Association of Harpur College, Inc. v.
Dawson.196 Here, and in the later cases of Faculty-Student Associ-
ation of State University College at Oswego, Inc. v. Sharkey, 97
the courts have extended the limits of acceptable educational orga-
nizations to include those which do not provide direct classroom
services. The faculty-student association, organized for the pur-
poses of providing housing, recreation, food and supplies to stu-
dents and faculty, has now been established as a qualified educa-
tional organization in the context of section 420. This is so to the
extent that in the latest in this line of cases, University Auxiliary
Services, Inc. v. Smith,'98 the organizational structure and purpose
is simply not an issue. One need only recall that the issue in the
Pace College case cehtered on the operation of the school cafeteria
by a private corporation to understand the full extent to which the
limits of this activity have been expanded by the post-war courts.
Ct. 1956), a/I'd, 4 A.D.2d 853, 167 N.Y.S.2d 240 (4th Dep't 1957).
190. In re Syracuse Univ., 59 Misc. 2d 684, 300 N.Y.S.2d 129 (Sup. Ct. 1969).
191. University Auxiliary Servs. at Albany, Inc. v. Smith, - A.D.2d -, 433 N.Y.S.2d
270 (3d Dep't 1980); Harvey School v. Town of Bedford, 34 A.D.2d 965, 312 N.Y.S.2d 586
(2d Dep't 1970).
192. American Mgmt. Ass'ns v. Assessor, Town of Madison, 63 A.D.2d 1102, 406
N.Y.S.2d 583 (3d Dep't 1978), a/I'd, 47 N.Y.2d 841, 392 N.E.2d 571, 418 N.Y.S.2d 584
(1979); Trustees of Columbia Univ. v. Taylor, 76 Misc. 2d 717, 351 N.Y.S.2d 928 (Sup. Ct.
1974). f
193. Chautauqua Inst. v. Town of Chautauqua, 35 A.D.2d 1, 312 N.Y.S.2d 364 (4th Dep't
1970); Rabbi Solomon Kluger School, Inc. v. Town of Liberty, 76 Misc. 2d 691, 351 N.Y.S.2d
563 (Sup. Ct. 1974).
194. Rudolph Steiner Educ. and Farming Ass'n, Inc. v. Brennan, 65 A.D.2d 868, 410
N.Y.S.2d 404 (3d Dep't 1978).
195. Mary Immaculate School v. Wilson, 73 A.D.2d 969, 424 N.Y.S.2d 251 (2d Dep't
1980); Glickenhaus v. Board of Assessors, 40 A.D.2d 1059, 338 N.Y.S.2d 995 (3d Dep't 1972).
196. 57 Misc. 2d 112, 292 N.Y.S.2d 216 (Sup. Ct. 1967)..
197. 35 A.D.2d 161, 316 N.Y.S.2d 698 (4th Dep't 1970), a/Id, 29 N.Y.2d 621, 273 N.E.2d
139, 324 N.Y.S.2d 411 (1971).
198. - A.D.2d -, 433 N.Y.S.2d 270 (3d Dep't 1980).
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IV. The Local Option to Tax: To Stem the Erosion
(1974-1980)
The relentless march of decisional law which has so markedly
changed the scope of this exemption statute has occurred, as stated
at the outset, within a context of virtual legislative silence since
1896. Aside from several amendments which were perceived to be
primarily corrective,'" the only exception to this silence was the
legislative actions of 1971 and 1972.
In 1969, pursuant to resolution, 00 a Joint Legislative Committee
for the Study and Investigation of Real Property Tax Exemptions
was established. The Committee's report20' issued in 1970, re-
counted other studies which had preceded it,2°2 and noted the con-
tinuing increase in the value of real property owned by nonprofit
organizations.20  In response, the Committee included in its recom-
199. 1980 N.Y. Laws ch. 818; 1948 N.Y. Laws ch. 622. See N.Y. LEGis. ANNUAL 291
(1948).
200. See N.Y. Assy. REs. No. 165, 198th Sess. (1969) (first clause of the preamble of
which provides "WHEREAS, A growing number of properties which were an important
source of taxable revenues in many municipalities of New York State are exempt from taxa-
tion as, increasingly, they have been acquired by religious, educational, charitable, fraternal
and other non-profit [sic] organizations, associations, and corporations. .... ").
201. N.Y. LEGIs. Doc. No. 15 FINAL REPORT OF THE JoINr LEGISLATIVE COMMITrEE TO-
STUDY AND INVESTIGATE REAL PROPERTY TAX EXEMPTIONS (1970) [hereinafter cited as Joint
Legislative Committee Report).
202. N.Y. LEGis. Doc. No. 62 (1935); N.Y. LEaKs. Doc. No. 77 (1932); N.Y. LEGis. Doc.
No. 72 (1922); N.Y. SEN. Doc. No. 19 (1917).
203. Any discussion of the assessed value of wholly exempt property in New York is
suspect because of the unreliability of assessments placed on such property. John Godfrey
Saxe contended that the assessed values, at least in 1933, were inflated. J. SAXE, CHARITABLE
EXEMPTION FROM TAXATION IN NEW YORK STATE ON REAL AND PERSONAL PROPERTY 76 (1933).
An annual report of the State Tax Commission issued at about that time was "unable to
state whether the valuations put upon the exempt property are better or worse than valua-
tions put upon taxable property." ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONERS OF STATUTORY
REVISION OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 169 (1934). While Mr. Saxe may have been correct
that some wholly exempt parcels are unequally assessed at inflated values because the ex-
empt property owners feel little, if any, necessity to protest the assessment against which no
taxes will be levied, it is no less correct to assume that some wholly exempt parcels are
considerably underassessed because the assessor feels there is little purpose in expending
time and energy in calculating an equitable assessment on such property. It was because of
the unreliability of assessed valuations on wholly exempt property that § 520 of the Real
Property Tax Law, 1978 N.Y. Laws ch. 635 (codified at N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 520
(McKinney Supp. 1980)), providing for the taxation of transferred exempt property during
the year of the.transfer, includes a provision for reassessment as of the date of transfer. See
N.Y. LEGKS. ANNUAL 362, 363 (1978).
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mendations that the exemption for nonprofit organizations, other
than religious, charitable, educational, cemetery and hospital orga-
nizations, be made optional with municipal corporations and that a
study be made of the constitutional prohibition, article XVI, sec-
tion 1, against legislative alteration of exemptions for religious,
charitable or educational organizations.20 4 Although the latter rec-
ommendation was apparently never implemented, the substance of
the local option to the tax proposal was enacted as chapter 414 of
the Laws of 1971.
After setting forth legislative findings consistent with those in
the aforementioned resolution, the chapter divided what had been
subdivision one of section 420 into paragraphs (a), (b) and (d) and
added a new paragraph (c). In newly designated paragraph (a), the
words "or conducted" were added after "a corporation or associa-
tion organized," while, as recommended by the Joint Legislative
Committee, all but five categories of exempt purposes were de-
leted. These deleted purposes205 were included in new paragraph
(b) which provided that corporations or associations organized or
conducted exclusively for these purposes would be exempt unless
the municipal corporation within which such an organization
owned property, after a public hearing, adopted a local law, resolu-
tion or ordinance to provide that one or more of these categories
would thereafter be taxable. Paragraph (c) provided that the local
law, ordinance or resolution must apply alike to all property within
the same category or categories. Paragraph (d) repeated the ex-
isting prohibition against pecuniary profit and was amended to re-
fer to new paragraphs (a) and (b).'"
As municipalities began to adopt local legislation to tax the new
optional exempt categories, litigation was commenced and pressure
brought to bear on the legislature, especially with respect to the
"moral or mental improvement" category, which included such
well-known organizations as the Boy and Girl Scouts and YMCA
204. JOINT LEGISLATIVE CoMMrrm REPORT, supra note 201, at 40-41.
205. These deleted purposes were: moral or mental improvement of men and women,
bible, tract, benevolent, missionary, infirmary, public playground, scientific, literary, bar as-
sociation, medical society, library, patriotic or historical, and for the enforcement of laws
relating to children and animals. Medical societies, not previously discussed, had been ad-
ded to the list of exempt categories by 1965 N.Y. Laws ch. 1063.
206. For further discussion of this amendment, see N.Y. LEGiS. ANNUAL 392 (1971); THE
REAL PROPsRTY TAX, supra note 26, at 122-24.
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and YWCA. As previously noted, this category was first added to
the law in 1893, following a case holding the YMCA to be taxa-
ble.207 Subsequently, this category of exemption has been con-
strued to refer only to organizations such as the Y's and the
Scouts2 °0
As a result of the 1971 amendment, a new issue was raised with
respect to section 420, namely, into which category would the ap-
plicant fit? Whereas, previously it had not been an issue as to
whether an applicant was, for example, "religious" or "bible," the
exercise of the local option made that determination crucial. The
cases began at once.
In Lower East Side Action Project, Inc. v. Town of Liberty209
the court held that the plaintiff's purposes and activities were for
moral and mental improvement, and, given the municipality's elec-
tion to tax such organizations, the property was taxable from the
date of the local law. It is apparent that as of the date that deci-
sion was rendered (that is, July 7, 1972), the court was unaware
that the Legislature had again amended section 420 to move the
category of moral and mental improvement of men, women and
children back into the mandatory list of exempt categories.21 0 The
amendment was made retroactive to apply to assessment rolls with
taxable status dates on or after January 1, 1972.211 The Lower East
Side Action Project returned to court, and the judge held the prop-
erty to be exempt.""'
Without question, the most significant action taken pursuant to
the new amendment was the 1971 adoption by the City of New
207. YMCA v. Mayor of New York, 113 N.Y. 187, 21 N.E. 86 (1889).
208. See, e.g., 5 Op. CoUNsEL SBEA No. 17.
209. 70 Misc. 2d 562, 334 N.Y.S.2d 333 (Sup. Ct.), modified, 87 Misc. 2d 860, 387
N.Y.S.2d 342 (Sup. Ct. 1972).
210. See 1972 N.Y. Laws ch. 529. For the memorandum in support of this legislation, see
N.Y. LEGIs. ANNUAL 266 (1972). The bill was supported by the YMCA, the Boy Scouts, and
the Office of Urban Affairs, and opposed by the Citizen's Union, the Association of the Bar
of the City of New York, the Town of Schroon (which had just opted to tax such proper-
ties), the County Officers Association and the Essex County Republican County Committee.
Neutral positions were taken by Audit and Control, the Attorney General, Department of
Taxation and Finance, the Department of State, the Division of the Budget and the Office
for Local Government. The objections to the bill centered on its impact upon local tax bases
and the vagueness of the term "mental and moral improvement."
211. The same date on which 1971 N.Y. Laws ch. 414 became effective.
212. Lower East Side Action Project v. Town of Liberty, 87 Misc. 2d 860, 387 N.Y.S.2d
342 (Sup. Ct. 1972).
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York of a local law to tax all of the optional categories of exemp-
tion.213 Properties which hitherto had been exempt were now re-
turned to the tax rolls, not on the basis of a failure to satisfy one or
more of the three steps of the traditional test, but rather, because
the city assessors had determined that the properties were "para-
graph (b)" types. However, the 1971 legislation did not change or
add to any of the basic language of the statute, so that the issues
created by chapter 414 must be resolved in a complete void of
terms of statutory definition. The result, beginning in 1973, was a
rush to the courts by a myriad of organizations seeking judicial
approval of their right to be classified within paragraph (a).
Because prior to 1972, qualification within any category had
meant a mandatory exemption, there had been no real need for
interpretations which distinguished between apparently related
purposes and activities such as religious, bible and tract or educa-
tional, scientific and literary.'1 Moreover, most major decisions in-
volved the extent to which a concededly qualified organization
could use its property for otherwise non-exempt uses and retain
the exemption. Thus, the available decisional law was primarily
concerned with use rather than purpose and was not generally of
direct relevance to the issue. However, in construing the 1971
amendment and in making distinctions between and among the re-
lated purposes, the courts have not been reluctant to draw on the
modern decisional law relating to "incidental use."
The court of appeals first considered the local option provision
in 1974, in Association of the Bar v. Lewisohn,'1 wherein it upheld
the constitutionality of the new law. The court recognized the ap-
plicant's public benefit but said that public benefit was not the test
of exempt status, and that the legislature's purpose was to stem
213. N.Y.C. LocAL LAWS, No. 46 (1971).
214. One case which did discuss the possible differences was In re Watson, 171 N.Y. 256,
63 N.E. 1109 (1902), wherein the court noted that the legislature had obviously intended to
differentiate between missionary societies and moral and mental improvement associations
in that each was named "separately and specifically in the same context." Id. at 261, 63 N.E.
at 1111. See also Matter of De Peyster, 210 N.Y. 216, 104 N.E. 714 (1914) (differentiating
"historical" from "educational"); Matter of Francis, 121 A.D. 129, 105 N.Y.S. 643 (4th
Dep't), af'd, 189 N.Y. 554, 82 N.E 1126 (1907) (differentiating "library" from "educa-
tional"). For a discussion of the post-1971 differentiation, see Trustees of Columbia Univ. v.
Town of Orangetown, 93 Misc. 2d 261, 402 N.Y.S.2d 899 (Sup. Ct. 1976). aff'd, 60 A.D.2d
582, 399 N.Y.S.2d 708 (2d Dep't 1977)
215. 34 N.Y.2d 143, 313 N.E.2d 30, 356 N.Y.S.2d 555 (1974).
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the erosion of municipal tax bases. The court also recognized that
although the petitioning organization had educational attributes,
nevertheless its primary purposes were included within the catego-
ries for optional exemption and, therefore, the property was now
subject to taxation.
The same year, the court reviewed yet another Watchtower case
and continued the exemption of the governing body of the Jeho-
vah's Witnesses,"1 finding its printing facility to be a religious use
of property in the context of paragraph (a) of section 420(1). In so
doing, the court stated that the taxing authority had failed to
"prove not only that the corporate owner is organized exclusively
for bible and tract purposes, but as well that it is not organized or
conducted exclusively for religious purposes."21 The court distin-
guished the Bar Association case, stating that the taxing authority
had met both requirements of proof in that case; that is, 1) that
the property owner was not organized or conducted exclusively for
one or more of the mandatory categories of exemption, and 2) that
the owner was organized or conducted for one or more of the op-
tional categories of exemption. It is impossible to ascertain
whether, as suggested by the language of the opinion, the court
actually put the burden of proof on the municipality, but, if so, the
holding raises a particularly difficult issue of balancing conflicting
burden of proof principles. There is nothing in the history of chap-
ter 414 of the Laws of 1971 to -indicate that the legislature in-
tended that the burden categorizing an applicant should be on the
municipality. And since the issue in these cases is basically the en-
titlement to exemption, there would seem to be strong support for
the proposition that the strict construction rule should control.2 1
Notwithstanding the Watchtower decision, in two subsequent
cases the court of appeals found applicants to be entitled only to
the optional exemption and, therefore, given New York City's local
law, subject to taxation. The American Bible Society, whose certifi-
216. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y v. Lewisohn, 35 N.Y.2d 92, 315 N.E.2d 801, 358
N.Y.S.2d 757 (1974).
217. Id. at 97, 315 N.E.2d at 803, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 759 (emphasis in original).
218. For some discussion of this problem, see City of Lackawanna v. State Bd. of Equal.
and Assessment, 16 N.Y.2d 222, 236-37, 212 N.E.2d 42, 50-51, 264 N.Y.S.2d 528, 539-40
(1965) (Bergan, J., dissenting); Grumman Aircraft Eng'r Corp. v. Board of Assessors, 2
N.Y.2d 500, 510, 141 N.E.2d 794, 799, 161 N.Y.S.2d 393, 400 (1957).
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cate of incorporation provided that its purpose was to publish and
circulate the holy scriptures without note or comment, was found
to be a bible organization, not a religious organization. The basis of
the court's holding was its finding that
The promotion of religion in a broad or generic sense is the by-product of
the accomplishment of the Society's corporate Bible purpose. In this sense
we distinguish [Watchtower in which] . . . the corporation was the gov-
erning body of the religious group known as Jehovah's Witnesses, thus 'the
eccliastical governing body of a recognized religious denomination with its
own beliefs and form of organization' [citations omitted]. In the present
case there is no corporate affiliation between the American Bible Society
and any denomination, sect, or ogranization having as its avowed purpose
the furthering of a recognized religion .... 19
The same day, the court of appeals, while not precisely catego-
rizing the Swedenborg Foundation, found that it did not fit within
any of the mandatory categories and, therefore, was taxable.220 The
organization was not religious although it shared a common inter-
est with the Church of New Jerusalem. Likewise, it was not educa-
tional because the court restricted that term to "the development
of faculties and powers and the expansion of knowledge by teach-
ing, instruction or schooling." 21'
The new judicial decisions related to the 1971 amendment are
perhaps the clearest indication of the judiciary's continuing role in
establishing social policy through this exemption. Watchtower, in
combination with American Bible and America Press, established
the test of association with established religious organizations as
both a condition for classification as religious and a protection
against taxation of organizations such as America Press.2 The
courts' disinclination to separate the printing and publishing activ-
ities from the religious associations of the organizations in two of
these cases would seem to be consistent with the judiciary's previ-
219. American Bible & Tract Soc'y v. Lewisohn, 40 N.Y.2d 78, 85, 351 N.E.2d 697, 701,
386 N.Y.S.2d 49, 53 (1976). See also America Press, Inc. v. Lewisohn, 74 Misc. 2d 562, 345
N.Y.S.2d 396 (Sup. Ct. 1973), afl'd, 48 A.D.2d 798, 372 N.Y.S.2d 194 (1st Dep't 1975).
220. Swedenborg Foundation, Inc. v. Lewisohn, 40 N.Y.2d 87, 351 N.E.2d 702, 386
N.Y.S.2d 54 (1976).
221. Id. at 94, 351 N.E.2d at 705, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 58.
222. American Bible & Tract Soc'y v. Lewisohn, 40 N.Y.2d at 85-86, 351 N.E.2d at 701,
386 N.Y.S.2d at 53; America Press, Inc. v. Lewisohn, 74 Misc. 2d at 565, 345 N.Y.S.2d at
400. See also Mary Immaculate School v. Wilson, 73 A.D.2d 969, 424 N.Y.S.2d 251 (2d Dep't
1980).
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ously described reluctance to become unnecessarily involved in is-
sues which are intimately related to religion.22 3 On the other hand,
the Swedenborg line of cases2 ' seems to show that in reviewing
municipal determinations which involve organizations not directly
associated with organized religion, the courts appear more inclined
to apply and reiterate traditional rules of strict construction. In-
deed, the presence or association with religion appeared to be the
critical favor in distinguishing these cases until Mohonk Trust v.
Board of Assessors,"" a 1979 court of appeals decision in which at
least two significant determinations were made.
The first determination in Mohonk is that environmental and
conservation are mandatorily exempt purposes within section 420
(1)(a) because "the Legislature has not seen fit to remove environ-
mental and conservation purposes from the broad category of char-
itable, educational, or mental or moral improvement of man pur-
poses within which they so neatly fit.""" The history of section 420
and its predecessors has heretofore been discussed at length, and it
is noted that neither "environmental" nor "conservation" has ever
been included within the list of exempt purposes. As stated in a
preceding section, it is difficult to fit this interpretation within any
rule of strict construction.
Yet, perhaps the more significant determination of the opinion is
its discussion of chapter 414 of the Laws of 1971. While referring
to the division of the formerly exempt categories into mandatory
and optional groupings, the court stressed another previously men-
tioned portion of the amendment to subdivision one of section 420,
wherein the words "or conducted" were added, thereby resulting in
the requirement "organized or conducted exclusively" for one or
more of the specified exempt purposes. The court in Mohonk
states that prior to the 1971 amendment, an essential element of
the test for exemption was to be "organized" for an exempt pur-
pose, which determination was in large part limited to an examina-
223. But see Religious Soc'y of Families v. Town of Carroll, 73 Misc. 2d 923, 343
N.Y.S.2d 159 (Sup. Ct. 1973).
224. Collector's Club v. Tishelman, N.Y.L.J., July 30, 1979, at 6, col. 5 (Sup. Ct.), afl'd,
- A.D.2d -, - N.Y.S.2d - (lst Dep't 1979); Moral Re-Armament, Inc. v. Tax
Comm'n, N.Y.L.J., July 12, 1978, at 6, col. 1 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 72 A.D.2d 722, 422 N.Y.S.2d
872 (lst Dep't 1979).
225. 47 N.Y.2d 476, 392 N.E.2d 876, 418 N.Y.S.2d 763 (1979).
226. Id. at 485, 392 N.E.2d at 880, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 768.
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tion of the applicant's corporate documents. In Mohonk it appears
that the court determined that the 1971 amendment meant that a
determination of an organization's primary purpose may now turn
upon the extent to which it carries out exempt purposes and is no
longer dependent upon the language of its organizational
documents.2 27
The Mohonk decision is apparently a judicially made policy de-
termination which significantly expands the scope of the exemp-
tion. The addition of the category of "environmental or conserva-
tion" can, of course, be anticipated as a means by which owners of
previously taxable holdings of unimproved land may now claim the
benefits of the exemption.2 2 8 However, and perhaps, as suggested,
of even greater import is the court's apparently substantial modifi-
cation of the organization test. The first manifestation of this new
issue was not long in coming.
In St. Joseph's Health Center Properties, Inc. v. Srogi, a
sharply divided court of appeals appears to have extended the inci-
dental use doctrine to the organizational test on the basis of the
"or conducted" change. Perhaps appropriately in light of the his-
tory of the law, this case concerned housing for hospital person-
nel. 2 9 The majority correctly pointed out there is nothing in the
scant legislative history of chapter 414 of the Laws of 1971 to ex-
plain the insertion of the words "or conducted," although the
amendment "was made at a time when municipalities were being
granted relief the need for which was well documented." However,
the majority concluded that the absence of intent in regard to the
addition of "or conducted" suggested "the Legislature's intention
to exempt property owned by a corporation conducted for a pur-
pose reasonably incident to the major purpose of another subdivi-
227. Without emphasizing the 1971 amendment, a lower court had previously held that
where, from an analysis of its incorporation papers, an organization was not found not to be
organized exclusively for exempt purposes, a determination of its conduct was necessary.
Return Realty Corp. v. Ranieri, 78 Misc. 2d 825, 359 N.Y.S.2d 611 (Sup. Ct. 1974). The
court of appeals reiterated its conclusion in Mohonk in North Manursing Wildlife Sanctuary
v. City of Rye, 48 N.Y.2d 135, 397 N.E.2d 693, 422 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1979).
228. See North Manursing Wildlife Sanctuary v. City of Rye, 48 N.Y.2d 135, 397 N.E.2d
693, 422 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1979); Catskill Center for Conservation and Dev., Inc. v. Voss, 63
A.D.2d 1091, 406 N.Y.S.2d 375 (3d Dep't 1978).
229. 51 N.Y.2d 127, 412 N.E.2d 921, 432 N.Y.S.2d 865 (1980). Mohonk and North
Manursing had been unanimous decisions whereas the court in St. Joseph's was divided by
a vote of 4 to 3.
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sion (a) exempt corporation, even though not itself organized to
engage in all of the activities of the latter corporation. 2 80 The dis-
sents 1 restated the court's holding in Mohonk, but concluded that
the 1971 amendment was not intended to eliminate the dual test
for exemption pursuant to section 420 (that is, organizational pur-
pose and property use). The dissenters charged that the majority
was overlooking the organization requirement and focusing solely
upon the use requirements, thereby applying only half of the statu-
tory test for exempt status.
It appears that the court of appeals overread this provision of
the 1971 amendment in Mohonk and has continued to do so.
While, as the majority in St. Joseph's Health Center correctly
point out, there is a scant legislative history concerning chapter
414 of the Laws of 1971, what little there is suggests absolutely no
intention on the part of the legislature to expand the exemption
umbrella in section 420. As noted above, the Joint Legislative
Committee which recommended the amendment232 did so in order
to expand the tax base and limit exemptions. The sponsor's mem-
orandum for 1971 Assembly bill 7228 (subsequently enacted as
chapter 414) is limited to a discussion of the local option provision
of the then proposed legislation.2 3 No comment is made in the
sponsor's memorandum concerning the inclusion of the phrase "or
conducted." Given the stated purpose of the legislation, it seems
inconsistent to conclude that the Legislature intended to liberalize
the exemption with respect to what thereafter became the
mandatory category of nonprofit exempt organizations, especially
in the absence of any comment stating this intent. Rather, it
seems far more reasonable to assume that the inclusion of the
phrase "or conducted" was meant merely as a technical amend-
ment made to conform the statute to the language of the state con-
stitution. Indeed, prior to Mohonk, the court of appeals used the
terms "organized" and "conducted" interchangeably, with no indi-
cation of different meanings being ascribed to the terms.'3 '
230. Id. at 133, 412 N.E.2d at 923, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 867-68.
231. Id. at 136-37, 412 N.E.2d at 926, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 870 (Cooke, C. J., dissenting).
232. JoinT LEGISLATIVE COMMrI'rEE REPORT, supra note 201.
233. N.Y. LEGiS. ANNUAL 392 (1971).
234. See, e.g., Swedenborg Foundation, Inc. v. Lewisohn, 40 N.Y.2d at 93, 351 N.E.2d at
705, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 57.
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V. Conclusion: The Ill to be Cured
The policy of the law has been, in this State from an early day, to en-
courage, foster and protect corporate institutions of religious and literary
character, because the religious, moral and intellectual culture afforded by
them were deemed, as they are in fact, beneficial to the public, necessary to
the advancement of civilization, and the promotion of the welfare of society.
And, therefore, those institutions have been relieved from the burden of
taxation by statutory exemption. 8 6
This statement by the court of appeals would seem to be an
accurate and concise summary of the current attitude of the courts
in applying our 1896 law to modern conditions. The perceived obli-
gation of the courts, unrestricted by modern, responsive state legis-
lation, makes the duty and responsibility of the local assessor all
the more difficult. Determining the extent to which to grant or to
deny exemptions to properties which are being used for new pur-
poses by traditional organizations is as complex a question as has
been reviewed in the preceding pages. The task of making a deter-
mination based on precedents iather than statute is even more dif-
ficult when the petitioning organization is one such as St. Joseph's
Health Center, which does not easily fit within the traditional cate-
gories. The establishment of organizations and facilities devoted to
the care, treatment and rehabilitation of persons addicted to drugs
is another recent example of this problem. As previously noted, in
Lower East Side Action Project, Inc. v. Town of Liberty" the
.court found that such activity fell within the cagegory of moral and
mental improvement of men, women and children and ultimately
held the property to be exempt (following the 1972 amendment).23
However, in Glickenhaus Foundation v. Board of Assessors,38 the
court held that insufficient information had been elicited at trial
and remanded the case for further proceedings prior to making its
determination. Similarly in Catskill Center for Conservation and
Development, Inc. v. Voss, the appellate division was reluctant
without further factual development to find property exempt be-
cause of ownership and use for purposes of conservation and envi-
235. People ex rel. Seminary of Our Lady of Angels v. Barber, 49 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 27, 30
(5th Dep't 1886), aff'd, 106 N.Y. 669, 13 N.E. 936 (1887).
236. 70 Misc. 2d 562, 334 N.Y.S.2d 333 (Sup. Ct. 1972).
237. 1972 N.Y. Laws ch. 125.
238. 40 A.D.2d 1059, 1061, 338 N.Y.S.2d 995, 997 (3d Dep't 1972).
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ronmental protection.289
The development, ownership and operation of properties which
are devoted to the care of needy and elderly people would appear
to be among the most urgent issues that the courts are now being
required to determine in the context of the nonprofit exemption
statute. Older lower court decisions such as Great Neck Section,
National Council of Jewish Women, Inc. v. Board of Assessors,24
and American-Russian Aid Association, Inc. v. City of Glen
Cove 2 41 seemed to lend support to the proposition that organiza-
tions which are structured and operate exclusively for the benefit
of persons in need of charity may indeed qualify for exemption.2 4s
However, where that proof is lacking the issue becomes whether
the ownership and operation of a housing facility is an activity
which qualifies for the statutory exemption.
Litigation on this new issue initially developed without regard to
the 1971 amendment. In reviewing this issue upon the basis of es-
tablished decisional law, the courts have initially applied the tradi-
tional rules of strict construction. Thus, despite stated charter
objectives,
the record overwhelmingly shows that petitioner used its facilities with the
purposeful design of operating a vacation resort into which convalescents
entered, if they entered at all, unsolicited and then only after petitioner had
determined that it would not be burdened with their care. Such a variance
between corporate character and corporate conduct sustains a denial of ex-
emption by the express language of Section 420 of the Real Property Tax
Law.2 43
Likewise, an organization whose purpose was to hold title to real
and personal property utilized by a separate organization for the
care of retarded children was also denied exemption on the basis of
traditional interpretations.2 4  Also, an organization owning an
239. 63 A.D.2d 1091, 1092, 406 N.Y.S.2d 375, 376 (3d Dep't 1978). The resolution of that
issue was accomplished in Mohonk Trust v. Board of Assessors, 47 N.Y.2d 476, 392 N.E.2d
876, 418 N.Y.S.2d 763 (1979).
240. 21 Misc. 2d 142, 189 N.Y.S.2d 623 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
241. 41 Misc. 2d 622, 246 N.Y.S.2d 123 (Sup. Ct. 1964), aff'd, 23 A.D.2d 966, 260
N.Y.S.2d 589 (2d Dep't 1965).
242. Church Home v. Wagner, 58 A.D.2d 972, 397 N.Y.S.2d 478 (4th Dep't 1977).
243. Valeria Home, Inc. v. Cook, 28 A.D.2d 893, 894, 282 N.Y.S.2d 41, 43 (2d Dep't
1967), afl'd, 22 N.Y.2d 388, 239 N.E.2d 631, 292 N.Y.S.2d 882 (1968).
244. Columbia County Mental Retardation Realty Co. v. Palen, 97 Misc. 2d 9, 410
N.Y.S.2d 789 (Sup. Ct. 1978). But see St. Joseph's Health Center Properties, Inc. v. Srogi,
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apartment complex for persons over the age of sixty-two was held
to be outside the scope of the statute. Finding that "the tenants
pay substantial admission fees and regular rents and service
charges designed to provide income to make the apartments self-
sustaining, the tenants are self-supporting and the apartment com-
plex does not dispense charity," the appellate division held that
"the record demonstrates that its property is not used for exempt
purposes. '2 45
The decision-making process which has been described in the
preceding pages obviously places a significant burden on the public
officials charged with primary responsibility for assessment admin-
istration. In making determinations involving organizations and ac-
tivities which are so fraught with emotion and subjectivity, it
seems quite obvious that local assessors should have both a basic
understanding of the law and a complete command on the facts
upon which the applicant bases its right to the exemption.
Although the ability of anyone to attain a basic understanding of
this law may be highly problematic, there should be a capacity to
gather the necessary factual information. Yet despite the evident
complexity, sensitivity and ambiguity of the subject matter, until
1979, there was no standard statewide method for either obtaining
that information or training assessors in the appropriate decision-
making process.
In an effort to assist assessors in ascertaining whether particular
parcels of individual nonprofit organizations qualify for the exemp-
tion pursuant to section 420, in 1979, the State Board of Equaliza-
tion and Assessment promulgated application forms designed to
elicit from the applicant organizations the information necessary
for the assessor to make an informed decision. Pursuant to stat-
ute46 and a rule of the State Board,' assessors now must have
51 N.Y.2d 127, 412 N.E.2d 921, 432 N.Y.S.2d 865 (1980).
245. Presbyterian Residence Center Corp. v. Wagner, 66 A.D.2d 998, 999, 411 N.Y.S.2d
765, 767 (4th Dep't 1978), afl'd, 48 N.Y.2d 885, 424 N.Y.S.2d 896, 400 N.E.2d 1348 (1979).
See also Bedford-Stuyvesant Restoration Corp. v. Lewisohn, 50 A.D.2d 815, 376 N.Y.S.2d
912 (2d Dep't 1975); Jeantet Residence for Seniors, Inc. v. Commissioner of Fin., 105 Misc.
2d 1080, 430 N.Y.S.2d 545 (Sup. Ct. 1980); Belle Harbor Home of the Sages, Inc. v.
Tishleman, 100 Misc. 2d 911, 420 N.Y.S.2d 343 (Sup. Ct. 1979).
246. See generally N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW §§ 202, 202(1)(h) (McKinney 1972 &
Supp. 1980); 1978 N.Y. Laws ch. 125.
247. 9 N.Y.C.R.R. §§ 190-1.3(c).
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completed application forms from nonprofit organizations on file
for each section 420 exemption entered on the assessment roll.24 8
Several forms are required for each exemption.
The development of these forms began shortly after the enact-
ment of chapter 125 of the Laws of 1978, which amended section
202 of the Real Property Tax Law specifically to authorize the
State Board to prescribe exemption application forms. Although it
is likely the State Board of Equalization and Assessment would
have had such authority without the amendment to section 202(h)
of the Real Property Tax Law, the enactment of this amendment
removed any doubts on the question."'
After an intensive period of development, including consultation
with and comment from representatives of various nonprofit orga-
248. This requirement became effective for all assessing units defined in N.Y. REAL
PROP. TAX LAW § 102(1) (McKinney 1972), having taxable dates, see N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX
LAW § 302 (McKinney 1972), occurring on or after April 1, 1979. Organization purpose infor-
mation is required on form EA-420-ORG. Where necessary, income information is elicited
on form EA-420-ORG (Schedule A). Schedule A is not normally required where the appli-
cant has received a Federal income tax exemption as the assessor is authorized to rely on
the Internal Revenue Service's finding of nonprofit status for purposes of the nonprofit re-
quirement of § 420. One copy of form EA-420-ORG is required to be filed in each assessing
unit in which the applicant seeks exemption.
An assessor garners property use information from form EA-420-USE, one of which is
required for each separately assessed parcel in recognition of the fact that an organization
may be using its several parcels for differing purposes, some of which may be exempt, and
some of which may not.
In each succeeding year after the first year in which exemption is granted following the
submission of the above forms, renewal forms, e.g., EA-420-RNW-I and EA-420-RNW-II,
may be utilized by the applicant. Villages which rely on the town (or county) assessment roll
as the basis of the village assessment, see N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 1402(1) (McKinney
1972), may utilize a special form (EA-420-VLG) in lieu of the others. Note also that special
forms for property held in trust by clergymen pursuant to § 436 of the Real Property Tax
Law, N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 436 (McKinney Supp. 1980) (EA-436) and property used
for the residence of officiating clergymen, exempt pursuant to § 462 of the Real Property
Tax Law (EA-462), N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 462 (McKinney 1972), have also been
prescribed.
249. 1978 N.Y. Laws ch. 125. An examination of the Bill Jacket for this chapter discloses
that the bill was supported by the State Board of Equalization and Assessment, which
drafted it, by the New York State Association of Counties, and by the Real Property Sec-
tion of the New York State Bar Association Committee on Legislation. Neutral positions
were taken by the Division of the Budget, the Attorney General's Office, the Department of
Taxation and Finance, the Temporary State Commission on Real Property Tax, the New
York Conference of Mayors, and the Association of Towns. There was no opposition to the
bill.
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nizations, 50 the State Board issued the forms in January of 1979.
Sixty-five thousand sets of the original forms and instructions were
distributed to all assessors through the offices of the county real
property tax service agencies. This distribution was followed in
March, 1980, with a statewide distribution of annual renewal
forms.
State Board statistics based on the initial use of the forms show
that by August, 1980, assessors in 749 cities and towns (not includ-
ing New York City) had reported on their use of the forms. Over
$2.6 billion in assessed value remained exempt, the owners of such
property proving their entitlement to exemption to the satisfaction
of the assessor. However, nearly $8.5 million in assessed value' 51 of
formerly exempt property had been returned to the taxable por-
tion of the assessment roll, generally for failure to satisfy the prop-
erty use test for exemption.
In New York City, which first utilized the forms for purposes of
its 1980 assessment roll, based on its January 25 taxable status
date,'5 ' some 9,500 applications were mailed to owners of parcels
receiving exemption on the 1979 assessment roll pursuant to sec-
tions 426 or 462. By January 25, 1980, approximately 5,000 com-
pleted forms were returned, and by January 1, 1981, applications
had been received for approximately 8,300 parcels. Sixty-three par-
cels with a total assessed value of approximately $17.5 million were
returned to the tax roll after review of the forms. Preliminary res-
toration of the 1,200 remaining parcels added additional assessed
value estimated at $150 million. An initial investigation suggests
that perhaps ninety percent of these parcels will be shown to be
exempt once analysis is complete. With respect to those parcels
which initial investigation suggested to be ineligible for exemption,
the New York City Tax Commission granted an opportunity for
additional data to be submitted. The final results with respect to
these parcels are still pending.
As stated above, vigorous administration of this law requires not
only the compilation of information, but also an understanding of
250. See 1978 PROCEEDINGS OF THE STATE BOARD OF EQUALIZATION AND ASSESSMENT, vol.
I, Meetings of June 14, July 18, and September 8, 1978. See also 1979 PROCEEDINGS OF THE
STATE BOARD OF EQUAL. AND ASSESSMENT, Meeting of Dec. 14, 1979.
251. See note 203 supra for a discussion of the assessed values of exempt property.
252. N.Y.C. CHARTER § 1507.
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the legal rights and responsibilities of both the municipal govern-
ment, that is, the assessor and the property owner. The assessor
must be responsibile for both even-handed and correct treatment
of the rights of the owners of legitimately exempted properties and
a firm and aggressive decision-making process which ensures that
the municipal tax base and, therefore, the owners of non-exempt
properties, are protected as well. This decision-making process and
administration must be as complete and open as is necessary to
ensure public confidence in the entitlement to the exemptions set
forth on the annual assessment roll.
Directly related to the vigorous decision-making process of ad-
ministration is the clear authority given to assessors either to sepa-
rately assess exempt and non-exempt portions or, where separate
assessment is not possible, to apportion the assessed value of prop-
erty and enter the value of the portion eligible for exemption in a
separate column in the taxable portion of the assessment roll.5 3
Separate assessment of clearly taxable holdings of nonprofit orga-
nizations is a straightforward option which has always been availa-
ble to the assessors and should present no difficulty.2 54 However,
the alternative authority available to assessors to apportion the as-
sessed value of a single parcel between exempt and taxable uses
apparently is not quite so clear. Although the use of this method
was quite evident in major litigation such as St. Luke's255 and
Chautauqua,'s its use was called into question in a case against
New York City which ultimately resulted in the very strong state-
ment of approval by the court of appeals in 1970. In the case of
Sailors' Snug Harbor v. Tax Commission, a five-man majority re-
viewed the provision in subdivision five of section 502 of the Real
Property Tax Law, which had its origins at least as far back as the
Catholic Union v. Sayles case."' The court in Sailors' Snug Har-
bor stated that
[i]t would be an obstacle of almost insurmountable difficulty for assessors
253. N.Y. REA PROP. TAx LAW § 502(5) (McKinney 1972).
254. Board of Foreign Missions v. Board of Assessors, 244 N.Y. 42, 154 N.E. 816 (1926).
255. St. Luke's Hospital v. Boyland, 12 N.Y.2d 135, 187 N.E.2d 769, 237 N.Y.S.2d 308
(1962).
256. Chautauqua Inst. v. Town of Chautauqua, 35 A.D.2d 1, 312 N.Y.S.2d 364 (4th
Dep't), appeal denied, 27 N.Y.2d 485, 315 N.Y.S.2d 1025 (1970).
257. 32 A.D. 203, 53 N.Y.S. 65.(3d Dep't), aff'd, 157 N.Y. 679, 51 N.E. 1092 (1898).
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looking at the building to make an accurate physical allocation of
space ...
The reasonable thing for assessors to do in this situation, following the
words of the statute, is to fix . . . the 'amount' of the exemption. If this is
unfair or inaccurate it can be corrected after a trial of the proceeding. Nor-
mally the owners would know more about the actual apportionment than
anyone else, and the subject is fully within the court's power to review.6s
Where this authority is used to its fullest extent, such as in New
York City, not only is property added to and maintained on the
tax base, but the litigation is more often in regard to the appor-
tionment as opposed to the all-or-nothing issues that are presented
when apportionment is not used.
The continuing difficulty which confronts both the State Board
and the local assessors is that the limits and policies of the non-
profit exemption in New York State continue to be established pri-'
marily by means of judicial decision. Besides being expensive and
inefficient for this purpose, this method of policy-making has cer-
tain obvious limitations. By definition litigation presents only the
most difficult cases for decision, thereby often producing results
which may not be appropriate for the vast majority of those sub-
ject to the law. In addition, an unfortunate characteristic of the
advesarial system is that at times one of the parties may find itself
very much over matched in legal representation in court. In recent
years this concern was often expressed by small municipalities
which had entered into litigation with large and well endowed non-
profit organizations.259 Finally, of course, the decisions of the ap-
pellate courts, primarily in the case of the appellate division and
exclusively in the case of the court of appeals, are limited to the
record created in the trial court. Thus, it is not uncommon for the
appellate court to be required to render a decision of potentially
statewide significance on the basis of an obviously inadequate
258. Sailors' Snug Harbor v. Tax Comm'n, 26 N.Y.2d 444, 448-49, 259 N.E.2d 910, 912,
311 N.Y.S.2d 486, 489 (1970). See also Trustees of Columbia Univ. v. Taylor, 76 Misc. 2d
717, 351 N.Y.S.2d 928 (Sup. Ct. 1974).
259. As a result of this type of complaint from local officials, N.Y. R.AL PROP. TAx LAW
§ 202(1-a) (McKinney 1972) was enacted authorizing the State Board of Equalization and
Assessment to provide appropriate legal assistance to municipalities which were subjected to
judicial actions as a result of compliance with the State Board of Equalization and Assess-
ment rules, regulations, orders, determinations or instructions. 1978 N.Y. Laws ch. 739.
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record."e0
Beyond all these factors, of course, the overriding factor is that
by and large the policy is being established by the judiciary rather
than by the legislature. Whether this is a satisfactory state of af-
fairs is in fact a judgment for the legislature to make, and perhaps
up until the post-war era there may have been some validity in
concluding that the silence of the legislature could be equated
with its acquiescence to the policies established by the judiciary.
However, in recent times, beginning with the 1971 Joint Legisla-
tive Commission and continuing through the Temporary State
Commission on State and Local Finances6 1 and the Temporary
State Commission on the Real Property Tax,'6o the legislature has
indicated a continuing and growing concern for real property tax
administration in general, and exemptions, including the nonprofit
exemption, in particular.
The courts themselves are not unmindful of this concern, and
their suggestions and comments in regard to legislative responsibil-
ity and prerogative appear throughout the course of judicial deci-
sion-making which has occurred since 1938."s Most recently a trial
court judge was moved to protest that:
The ill which respondent seeks to cure is the eroding tax base confronting
municipalities as a result of the ever increasing amount of exempt proper-
ties. These properties, formerly taxable, are being acquired by a variety of
organizations currently entitled to exemption from taxation.
As municipalities face rising costs, the loss of tax revenue due to exemp-
tion requires a shifting of increases in taxes to the tax paying public. These
citizens and businesses, also faced with rising costs, are becoming increas-
ingly burdened by taxes and are required to pay more than what most feel
260. In re N.Y. Conf. Ass'n of Seventh-Day Adventists, 80 N.Y.S.2d 8 (Sup. Ct. 1948),
rev'd, 275 A.D. 742, 87 N.Y.S.2d 708 (4th Dep't 1949); Mary Immaculate School v. Wilson,
73 A.D.2d 969, 424 N.Y.S.2d 251 (2d Dep't 1980).
261. See 1973 N.Y. Laws ch. 1000 J 1; THz RE AL PROPERTY TAX, supra note 26, at 120-
35.
262. 1977 N.Y. Laws ch. 889 § 1.
263. Pace College v. Boyland, 4 N.Y.2d 528, 151 N.E.2d 900, 176 N.Y.S.2d 356 (1958);
Williams Institutional Colored Methodist Episcopal Church v. City of New York, 275 A.D.
311, 89 N.Y.S.2d 300 (1st Dep't 1949), aff'd, 300 N.Y. 716, 92 N.E.2d 58 (1950); People ex
rel. Doctors Hospital, Inc. v. Sexton, 267 A.D. 736, 48 N.Y.S.2d 201 (1st Dep't 1944), afl'd,
295 N.Y. 553, 64 N.E.2d 273 (1945). See also Sailors' Snug Harbor v. Tax Comm'n, 26
N.Y.2d 444, 259 N.E.2d 910, 311 N.Y.S.2d 486 (1970); People ex rel. Outer Court, Inc., of
the Order of the Living Christ v. Miller, 161 Misc. 603, 292 N.Y.S. 674 (Sup. Ct. 1936), afl'd,
256 A.D. 814, 10 N.Y.S.2d 208 (1st Dep't), aff'd, 280 N.Y. 825, 21 N.E.2d 881 (1939).
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is their fair share.
The problem continues to intensify and there does not appear to be an an-
swer on the horizon. The sole corrective step taken by the Legislature was
their recognition of the existence of the problem. (See 1971 N.Y. Laws ch.
414 § 1]. No further constructive action has been taken.
Respondent's remedy is to be found in the Legislature and not in the
Courts.s
While this observation is so surely consistent with those of other
judges who have been confronted by the nonprofit exemption law
in other years, there is a most crucial difference between the pre-
vailing judicial attitude of today as compared to that of fifty years
ago. In the context of the legislative silence since 1896, the probing
of the limits of the scope of the exemption by nonprofit organiza-
tions has continued to become more intense and more sophisti-
cated. And, since 1945, the results of that probing have been decid-
edly in the favor of those claiming exemption. How very much
different in terms of establishing policy is the observation of the
court quoted above when compared to the court in the 1893 YMCA
case:
Associations of this character are so useful and so deserving of encourage-
ment and support that a different result would please us better, but we are
unable to reach it under the law as it stands."68
Legislative decisions on the future policy direction must necessa-
rily be the result of a deliberative process as complex and varied as
the scope of the current law. The agenda need be as broad as the
Legislature deems appropriate, of course, but certain items would
already seem to be ripe for consideration. Included among these
would be the suggested constitutional change of the 1971 Joint
Legislative Committee,2 " the problem of the extent to and circum-
stances within which unimproved land should be exempt,2" 7 and
the apparent need to clarify the intent and administration of the
1971 amendment, both as to the organizational requirement 2 " and
264. Nassau County Council Boy Scouts of America v. Assessors, Town of Rockland, slip
op. at 14 (Sup. Ct. 1980).
265. See note 35 supra and accompanying text.
266. JOINT LEGISLATIVE Commrrz REPORT, supra note 201, at 41.
267. THE REAL PROPERTY TAX, supra note 26, at 128.
268. St. Joseph's Health Center Properties, Inc. v. Srogi, 51 N.Y.2d 127, 412 N.E.2d 921,
432 N.Y.S.2d 865 (1980).
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the definitions of the purposes and activities listed within
paragraphs (a) and (b) of subdivision one of section 420.
The last item listed, that of definitions, may be the most crucial.
In the analyses, deliberations and debates of the 1938 Constitu-
tional Convention, there was evident concern in regard to an in-
creasing burden being placed on taxable property as a result of the
extension of exemptions .2  Thus, not only did the 1938 Conven-
tion (and, ultimately, the new Constitution) limit the authority of
the legislature to enact exemptions, that is, by continuing the gen-
eral law limitation, it also specifically authorized the legislature to
limit the three "protected" exemptions by statute.2 70 Thus, the
constitutional provision, adopted in 1938 and in effect today, con-
tains three provisions with respect to exemptions, two of which are
clearly intended as limitations on the spread of exemptions:
1. Exemptions may be granted only by general law;
2. Exemptions may be altered or repealed;
3. Exemptions may not be altered or repealed which apply to property
owned by qualified nonprofit organizations and used exclusively for reli-
gious, educational or charitable purposes as defined by law.
Although "as defined by law" undoubtedly includes the law es-
tablished by the judiciary, there can be no doubt that the framers
of the 1938 Constitution anticipated the need for legislative clarifi-
cation and definition of the constitutionally protected purposes.271
Nor can there be any doubt that the phrase "as defined by law"
was placed in section one of article XVI for the express purpose of
enabling the legislature to enact definite legislation.
Improved administration alone will not relieve the pressure ex-
erted on the municipal governments by aggressive nonprofit orga-
nizations. Unless we are content to rely on the judicial system, the
legislature must review the current law and determine what it be-
lieves to be the appropriate basis for future state policy in this as-
pect of real property tax administration.
269. See notes 89-96 supra and accompanying text.
270. N.Y. CONST. art. XVI, § 1.
271. See notes 91-92 supra and accompanying text.
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